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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Jewish Society in Israel consists of a wide-ranging
mixture of ethnic, racial and religious groups.

For the

sake of convenience, they may be classified into the
Ashkenazic Jews of European and Russian origin, Sephardim
of Spanish and later North African origins, Jews of MiddleEastern and Balkano origins, and the Oriental Jews of West
Asian origin (Iran, India, Kurdistan, etc.).
Social conflicts have arisen between these groups for
many complex reasons.

During July through September of

1973 I had the opportunity to study these problems through
the sponsorship of the World Sephardi Federation.

Depend

ing upon one's point of view, Israeli social problems stem
from racial discrimination to the gross national product.
Solutions are often unimaginative and repeat mistakes
already made in other countries.

Observation led me to

believe that possible solutions to some of these problems
may derive from the application of basic social and physi
cal planning concepts, which will be explored later.
Expressing the weight of their numbers, organization,
and economic and political power, Ashkenazim have directed
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the Zionist movement and international Jewish organizations
ever since their inception.

For the most part, Oriental

and Sephardi Jews were unable to play an active role in the
Zionist movement for political, geographic and a number of
other reasons.

As a result, when they arrived in Israel

many were placed in "development areas", primarily new towns
without an economic base and located in high-risk border areas.
They simultaneously arrived at a time when the provision of
decent accommodations for newcomers was very low on the list
of national priorities.
In present day Israel more than twenty percent of the
population lives below the accepted poverty line.

Although

there are "haves" and "have-nots" in all countries, ninety
percent of the latter in Israel belong to Sephardi and
Oriental communities.

The problem, therefore, becomes com

munal as well as economic.

Many of these families suffer

malnutrition, inadequate housing and minimal educational
opportunities.

Consequently, seventy percent of the juve

nile delinquents in Israel come from these same communities.
Most are functionally illiterate and 30,000 of these juviniles have police records.
Poverty of this type is self-perpetuating and is
well on the way to creating a permanent sub-class in Israel
distinguished by semi-racial characteristics.

Equal oppor

tunity is meaningless to most members of a group who are
ill-equipped to break exclusionary patterns and enter the
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mainstream of Israeli society dominated by Western education
and manners.

Israeli society has largely accepted the notion

that in order to attract new immigrants from Western coun
tries, who possess occupational skills vital to Israeli
society, special opportunities and incentives will have to
be provided.

The Israeli Government, at the same time,

responded to comparable yet lesser demands for housing and
jobs from its own poor and long-time citizens
that they should patiently wait.

by suggesting

As a result, the disadvan

taged communities have displayed increasing antagonism
towards olim (immigrants in residence three years or less)
from Russia and the West because of the privileges granted
to them.
The problem of national integration between Sephardic
and Ashkenazic Jews is one of the crucial challenges facing
Israeli society.

There are many gaps in education, housing,

income distribution, and political representation between
these two groups.

Sephardic families earn less than

Ashkenazic ones, most families living in slums and crowded
housing are Sephardic, the percentage of Sephardic children
in high schools and universities relative to the total popu
lation is low, the poorer development towns are mainly
Sephardic, new immigrants get better apartments than many
who have been in Israel for more than twenty years, and most
of Israel's welfare recipients and 350,000 people living
below the poverty level are Sephardim or Orientals.
In seeking causes for the above disparities, many
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organized and individual Sephardo-Orientals accuse the
government of discrimination, which is to simplify the
problem - even though criticism of government social policy
is legitimate.

A large proportion of Sephardic immigrants

to Israel were unskilled and illiterate.

As a result, a

major reason for their lower average income is due to dis
advantages in skills and education.

Another major factor

behind social problems is that the majority of Sephardic
and Oriental Jews are relative newcomers in Israel.

In any

country older immigrants have a temporary economic advantage
over newer ones.

In any case, a large proportion of the

Sephardic community has advanced rapidly on economic, social
and political levels while a large minority has remained
below the poverty line.

An even larger proportion would

have achieved an average living standard had family size not
interfered.

Large families only compound problems such as

housing and tend to inhibit the development of children in
school.
Those who protest government policies are right to
demand more energetic efforts to provide better opportu
nities for

educational and economic advancement.

It is

incorrect, in many instances, to analyze the problem of
communal gaps strictly in terms of discrimination.

The

plight of uneducated, unskilled, welfare recipients and slum
dwellers requires more investment and imagination in the
quest for solutions.
This thesis, therefore, focuses upon the detailed

5

nature and causes of communal gaps between various social
groups in Israel.

In addition, approaches are explored

aimed at diminishing inequality of opportunities for various
ethnic groups in Israeli society.

CHAPTER II
BACKGROUND
Immigration to Israel varied greatly according to
country of origin and time of entry.

Immigrants from Moslem

countries were economically, culturally, and politically illequipped for what they found in Israel.

With different

family structures, they were not prepared to change, but
rather to perpetuate their existing cultures.

Certainly

they had no desire to assimilate any aspect of a Western
style of life.

Coming as they did, for the most part, from

countries still lagging far behind in technological develop
ment, Sephardic and Oriental immigrants have entered the
lower socio-economic strata of an Israeli society with politi
cal, social and economic patterns determined by European set
tlers .
The period of immigrant arrival was an important
factor in creating current social problems.

Depending upon

when one arrived, individual development was often intimately
tied to the political, ideological and economic development
of overall Israeli society. Those who came to Palestine
during the Mandate Period (1917-1948) were generally equipp
ed with appropriate ideological connections even before ar
rival; they came to settle the land.

In pre-1948 Palestine

and for part of the post-1948 period, the process of bring
6
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ing in new immigrants involved adapting the economy to their
integration, while at the same time modifying their occupa
tional, economic and social patterns.

An economic and oc

cupational realignment was required, reversing the conven
tional trend and reinstituting a movement from town to
country and from tertiary occupations (service, merchants,
clerical) to secondary (industrial) and primary (agri
cultural) ones.
After the establishment of the State, authorities
had to take charge of directing the sudden influx of new im
migrants to various locations.
moshavim and kibbutzim

Some were sent to immigrant

(collective agricultural settlements)

while others were referred to development towns.

This was

only an initial distribution and the newcomers were subse
quently free to choose their own places of residence.

The

pattern generally seemed to occur as in Table I.
Table I indicates that the greatest disparity in
settlement patterns lies between those from Moslem countries
and Europe.

The late arrival of the former precluded a role

in the development of the economy or institutions.

Whereas

the economy was somewhat adapted to new immigrants, it was
really an adaptation to European immigrants.

By the time

the Sephardic and Oriental immigrants arrived, the Europeans
had gone through a "rural cycle", where they had temporarily
sacrificed their tertiary occupations for primary ones.
Their later moves to cities and development towns were in
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pursuit of greater economic opportunities, generally based
upon earlier occupational training, prior to coming to
Israel.

The economy did not, however, adapt to later non-

European immigrants because there was not much to adapt to.
The paucity of their occupational skills did not allow much
flexibility in adaptation to new economic life in Israel.
They were placed in moshavim, often as laborers, or else in
poor development towns.

Those who later moved to cities had

not achieved new political or economic skills along the way.
TABLE I
IMMIGRATION BY PERIOD, COUNTRY OF ORIGIN
AND TYPE OF SETTLEMENT PROPENSITY1

Until 1933
Pioneering
Selective

1933-1948
Non-Selective

Place of Origin

1948 Onwards
Mass Immigra
tion initial
direction

Subsequent

Eastern Europe

Rural Set Moshavot
tlements

Development
town or moshav

City and de
velopment town

Western Europe

Rural Set City
tlements

—

—

Moslem Countries

”

City and de
Development
town or moshav velopment town

Though Table I uses the term development towns, no
indication is given of the wide variations which exist be
tween these areas.

The Europeans moved to development

'''Alexander Berlier, New Towns in Israel
Israel Universities Press, 1970), p.4.

(Jerusalem:
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towns for economic opportunities, such as Ashkelon and
Ashdod, with advanced port and shipping junctions, or Arad,
with a number of chemical industries; these towns are eco
nomically viable.

Sephardic immigrants, on the other hand,

were often placed in poor towns, such as Dimona, Mitzpeh
Ramon or Beit Shean.

Often placed in border areas, these

poorer towns have little economic viability, since the
reason for their existence is artificial and their geo
graphic site arbitrary.

Their inhabitants were placed there

by the government upon arrival as a means of settling other
wise undesirable areas.

They remain there because they have

little to offer somewhere else and, therefore, no prospect
for improving themselves.
Israel has always been an ideological country,
especially during its earlier years.

The choice of ideology

and level of one's ideological understanding were often the
keys to success.

Although some may view religion as an

ideology, political and social ideology shaped the structure
of modern Israel.

Country of origin was often the determi

nant of one's ideological involvement.
The Jewish communities from which the immigrants
came were of three types:
1.

Eastern Europe - Jews were mainly engaged in

"neutral" occupations, neither industry nor agriculture, but
dependent upon rural areas for supplies and on the towns for
customers.

They also resided in fringe areas (neither urban
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nor rural).

The occasional militant ostracism they

received from non-Jews only strengthened this behavior pat
tern.

The result was a synthesis between rural society and

an urban occupational structure and culture which character
ized the shtetl (or small, only Jewish towns).

Some Jews

moved to major cities where they established communities in
segregated neighborhoods.
2.

Western Europe - Here the Jews were more inte

grated because of a more powerful urbanization process.
Since Western cities were much more developed they found
far greater economic opportunities in liberal professions,
industrial-administrative positions, and the mercantile
trades.
3.

Moslem Countries - The situation here was dif

ferent from both Eastern and Western Europe.

Here the dis

tribution of Jews was similar to the indigenous population,
with a high percentage of the population found in the cities.
Significantly, there was a high degree of polarization with
in the Jewish community between a small wealthy elite and
an impoverished majority.

The Jewish population in these

countries, unfortunately, resembled the non-Jewish one in
terms of social and economic backwardness, typical of under
developed countries.
The impact of background upon present day circum
stances is striking.

Jews from Moslem countries are

deficient in political know-how and have no leadership
positions or models in modern Israel.

The majority of Jews
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from Moslem countries had, and still have, no communication
with Zionism or Zionist education.

Zionism implies an

entire doctrine concerning the voluntary regeneration of
the Jewish people in its own land.

Yet, whoever settles in

Israel is not necessarily a Zionist.

One must subscribe

to the Zionist ideology to be considered as one.

Zionism

is essentially a secular movement rooted in a modern
ideological conception of people and homeland.

From the

ideological point of view, the majority of Oriental Jews
are not Zionists.
The migration to Israel of Jews from Oriental
countries was due to their ties with Judaism rather than
Zionism.

This link to Judaism and thus, to the land of

Israel, has diminished in second and third generation
Oriental communities.

Attachment to heritage is becoming

continually weaker with the rise of new generations who
have grown up in an atmosphere which is free and uncompli
cated in its attitudes.
Jewish society in Israel continually builds on a
foundation of technology and progress regarded as ideology,
rather than Judaism.

As long as this technological culture

continues to exist Sephardic and Oriental Jews will find
themselves on the bottom of society.

While many Oriental

Jews may succeed in entering the technological and admini
strative elite, they would only be solving their own per
sonal problems and not those of their community as a whole.
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The heritage of the Eastern European shtetl still
affects the tenor of life in Israel.

That heritage was a

revulsion against caste and privilege and a positive com
mitment to social welfare and egalitarianism.

Life was with

the people and the source of strength was human solidarity.
When East European immigrants came to Israel, therefore,
they immediately adapted to the prevailing forces of Zionist
and Socialist thought, whether previously familiar with it
or not.

From the ideological point of view, North African

Jewry was very poorly prepared for immigration to Israel.
In Tunisia and Algeria the Zionist movement could express
itself freely during the period of French presence.

In

Morocco, however, the country that provided the largest
number of North African immigrants, the Zionist Movement
was tolerated but never legally recognized by the French;
the Zionists were obliged to act with discretion.

This

lack of ideological preparation is at the root of many of
the difficulties encountered by North African Jews on their
arrival in Israel.
The Oriental immigrants brought with them tradi
tional patterns of Jewish life which had been relatively
unaffected by ideological currents, such as those which had
swept through European Jewry.

In the fact of their

Jewishness, the Oriental and Sephardic Jews see a common
bond with their Ashkenazi brethren as the key to their
acceptance into Israeli society.

In addition, Orientals
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are anxious to distinguish themselves from Arabs, and they
are accordingly likely to stress their Jewishness.
In examining the historical development of Israeli
ideology it is important to note that the first wave of
immigrants (pre-1930) was crucial in later development.
They developed a pattern of politics and society that became
the national character; all those who followed had to fit
this pattern.
As in America, the first waves of immigrants developed
a set of attitudes and values so powerful that even
today, when the passage from pioneer society to modern
industrial state is nearly complete, one still associ
ates them with Israeli politics and manners.
It will
suffice to mention a few examples:
1) the party system
and its unique centrality in political life; 2) the
strong belief in equality; 3) the continuing informali
ty and simplicity in manners, dress, and language;
4) the agrarian ritual; 5) the belief in voluntary
action; and 6) the notion of an official (Zionist)
state ideology.
In a way, all this has created problems because of
conflicts between values, ideologies, and realities.
Through Zionism's rural ethic, many of Israel's present
values are rooted in a modern type of farm life which
stresses the importance of physical work.

The Israeli

village fostered many important ideas - the social image of
equality, respect for physical work, belief in changing the
face of nature through human efforts, and looking toward
development as a community responsibility.

Amos Elon, Israelis:
Bantam Books, 1971), P.191.

Founders and Sons,

(New York:
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As Israel developed

so grew its urban population

at a time when emphasis was not placed on how a city should
be built.

Ideologically the city in Israel was considered

unimportant.

While rural lands were being held as public

property, private persons acquired large areas in the cities
for speculation.

While in the West property dominated

social and political thought, in Israel private property
had been reduced to virtual insignificance.
In retrospect, the Zionist challenge was all em
bracing.

It not only rejected long established notions

concerning Jewish identity but also tried to abolish its
secondary characteristics, such as its predominantly urban
character.

The early Jewish settlements, therefore, at

tracted people inspired by purely ideological motives of
return to the land and egalitarianism.

Although the latter

was always deeply imbedded in ideology, equality has become
a touchy issue in Israel because of importation of poverty
and ignorance from areas where ideological models did not
apply.

The Zionist mystique of "return to the land" did

not appeal to people who had lived on the land and were
anxious to move to cities.

The goal of a national economy

owned by the workers through their trade unions had little
effect upon Afro-Asian immigrants who were refugees and not
ideologists.
The establishment of the State of Israel was con
nected with three major processes - the influx of new
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immigrants, the differentiation of the socioeconomic
structure, and the transformation of the pioneering elite
into the ruling elite.

The continuity of the process of

developing a collective identity has become a major problem
due to continued shifts in these processes.
The changing structural position of the elite con
stituted the focal point of these problems.

The ruling

elite has emphasized that its legitimacy depends upon an
adherence to various "movement" symbols and viewed them
selves as responsible for implementing major collective
goals inherent in the "movement" ideology.

The ruling

elite maintained and intensified adherence to the pione
ering-socialist ideology.

Adherence to their policies was

guided by a system of reward allocation achieved through
the major collective organizations, such as government it
self, the Histadrut (the General Labor Federation), and
various settlement organizations.

The elite, through its

system of rewards, counteracted tendencies toward autonomy
by different educational, professional, and occupational
groups, thereby minimizing status differentials that tended
to develop between various groups.

3

Major problems have arisen as to how the pioneer
image could continue to be the sole focus of identity and3

3

Israel

S.N. Eisenstadt, Integration and Development m
(New York: Praeger Press, 1970) , pp. 678-679.
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how its bearers could retain exclusive elite status.

In

an attempt to develop an "Israeli" identity the "pioneers"
and their successors tended to gloss over potential cleavages
between religious and secular groups, traditional and modern,
and between different ethnic traditions or cultural orien
tations .
With Israel's growth, for the most part, into a
Western country, changes have occurred in the strength of
its pioneering tradition

and adherence to Zionist ideology.

Such changes can also be found in other modern societies
whose formative stages were ideological.

Israel's future

social struggle lies in the extent to which commitments to
a collective ideology, through which it was hoped to forge
a modern Israeli culture, can be maintained in light of
technological and westernizing forces which threaten to
erode it.

CHAPTER III
SOCIAL COMPONENTS OF ETHNIC RELATIONS IN ISRAEL
Large cities have always provided crucial gateways
towards modernization in developing countries and they play
a leading role in breaking rural migrants away from tradi
tional social practices.

Migrants to the city are more

likely to be receptive to social change by being exposed to
a heterogenous population.

Both domestic and international

movements of population to cities can be attributed to an
economic "push" from the land and a "pull" attraction of
city living.
Migrants to Israel responded to "pushes" and "pulls"
which were spiritual, ideological, and nationalistic, rather
than economic and social.

Uniquely, the majority of im

migrants to Israel came from urban environments in their na
tive countries and went to rural environments in Israel.
Even though the cities of North Africa differed greatly from
those of Europe in terms of complexity and economic base,
they were all urban environments.

As pointed out in

Chapter II, more universal forces of migration became
operational in Israel after 1953.

This is where social

analysts in Israel often miss the point of origin to modern
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day social problems.
Changes have occurred in Israeli patterns of domes
tic migration since 1948 (see Table I).

A major issue con

cerns a sizeable population which has not yet attained
either a stable residence or a stable source of employment.
Rural-to-urban migrants in Israel have faced major societal
changes, experiencing problems similar to migrants in other
developing countries.

Some of these problems include the

breakdown of clan structure and abandonment of traditional
values; breakdown of the extended family and the development
of conflicts and misunderstandings within the family; in
stability of a society in flux; lack of education; conflicts
between children who are in school and parents who never
went; lack of understanding between educated parents and
children who have acquired new outlooks and values; con
flicts between husband and wife, when either begins to de
mand new standards; the rejection of traditional values and
customs by individuals not yet able to adapt to new ways;
poverty, overcrowding and malnutrition; and imitation of
Western standards and behavior without a real understanding
of them.^
A question arises which remains to be explored: is
it desirable for Israel's population to be composed of

4Mt. Carmel Int'l Training Center For Community
Services, International Seminar on Social & Cultural
Integration in Urban Areas
(Haifa, 1964), p.134.
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ethnic blocs grouped according to country of origin or does
such a composition impede effective reconstruction of a new
population?

On the one hand, this rather ethnically homo

genous settlement pattern makes it difficult to utilize
various waves of immigration and different ethnic groups as
components in building a larger society, since it offers a
reward to the more ethnically cohesive areas through the
political process.

On the other hand, if the various ethnic

groups are inter-mixed and forced to integrate, they might
lose necessary mutual support, available through social
solidarity, which assists new-comers in adapting to a new
society.

There are elements of both alternatives currently

operating in Israel.

It becomes important to first under

stand those social elements which create diversity and con
flict and those which minimize diversity and foster harmony.
These forces are crucial in conceptualizing their inter
action with and resolution through current and potential
social and physical planning methods.
The Nature of Ethnic Relations in Israel
Ethnic relations in Israel are exacerbated by the
complexity of defining clear-cut problem areas.

There are

multiple factors which both impede and promote integration
of Jewish ethnic groups in Israel.

It becomes difficult to

say that one factor clearly promotes integration while
another only impedes it.

Rather, one must weigh the dif

ferent impacts of these factors on society as a whole.

One
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could say, for example, that differences in ethnic back
ground have been a major impediment to social integration in
Israel.

Although all Jews share the same language (after

immigration) and religion they differ in dress, how they re
late to each other, in socialization patterns and family
structure.

One often hears claims in Israel about how primi

tive were the Moroccan Jews while the Western and European
Jews belonged to the most advanced middle-class of Western
society.

People often find it easier to cope with these

extreme examples, though they be factually incorrect.

Most

Orientals are really quite close to a modern life-style,
while many Europeans left environments only in the begin
ning stages of modernization, such as in the rural parts of
Eastern Europe.

It should be emphasized, nevertheless, that

Israel contains a large variety of ethnic behavior patterns.
These differences are significant where close contact and
coordination are necessary such as in schools, factories,
the army and when political issues have to be decided.
Religion also plays an important role in Israel and
could work either way with respect to ethnic relations.
There have been many differences among people in Israeli
(Jewish) society over matters of religious observance and
administration of the educational system.

The meaning

attached to religious symbols and events, such as the
Bibical Exodus from Egypt, or such rituals as fasting, is
quite varied depending upon background.

Whatever the nature

of observance, however, the same symbols are meaningful to
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everyone.

Differences arise in the degree to which people

are prepared to act upon them.

Because of religious dif

ferences, there are those who would completely separate
themselves from the mainstream

of Israeli society, while

there are others who view these symbols as a unifying force.
Another major area for consideration is the con
siderable correlation of ethnic background with economic
and demographic characteristics.

Issues which would be de

fined in ethnically homogenous societies as class differ
ences have implicit ethnic elements in Israel.

While such

statistics as income levels would seemingly indicate a
clear-cut issue of the "haves" vs. "have-nots", there are
other factors which would preclude clear impacts.

The

majority of Europeans immigrated prior to 1948 and seniority,
besides ethnicity, plays a vital role in determining one's
social position, as it would in any immigrant society.
Those who have been in the country longer have had greater
time and opportunity to gain more prestigious positions and
more desirable housing.

Thus we find that status differ

entials and ecological differentiation overlap
background.

with ethnic

Once again, in the political process, the ad

vancement of Orientals to leadership positions is quite
selective.

They are, therefore, less prominent in national

politics but well represented in local politics when
Orientals comprise the majority in a given locale.
While the overlap between socioeconomic status and
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ethnic background is an aggravating factor in ethnic re
lations, it is in the dynamic development of the Israeli
economy that improved ethnic integration is hoped for.

The

twenty-eight years of Israels' existence has been a period
of rapid expansion.

Although population expanded, resources

such as land, capital, expertise and power expanded even
more rapidly.

While the gap between average income of old-

timers and newcomers widened during the 1950's, this trend
was reversed in the 1960's; the gap has diminished steadily,
although slowly, since then.
Established Israelis, who are predominantly of
European origin, did not lose economically in sharing with
later immigrants, but actually prospered in the process due
to the enormous increase in resources which became available.
The economics of ethnic relations in Israel, therefore, was
more a mixed sharing of economic benefits.

Jews of European

origin not only gained economically from the influx of
Oriental Jews, but successive waves of immigration also
increased social mobility.

As the newcomers took over the

lowest positions, more powerful and rewarding roles opened
up for the old-timers.

Furthermore, the establishment of

the State, with all of its government branches and agencies,
provided new careers for which the better educated, more
experienced Europeans were natural candidates.

While the

Europeans benefited, so did the Orientals who attained in
come and standards-of-living well beyond what they possessed
in their countries of origin.
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Components Of Culture That Create Diversity
From the early days of the State of Israel, the sub
ject of unity vs. diversity has been debated.

To what ex

tent should the process of cultural integration aim at pro
ducing a level of uniformity as opposed to preserving the
traditions that each group developed in its previous en
vironment?

Unity is always desirable for a nation, yet each

diverse element offers a special contribution to national
culture.
Immigration to Israel since 1948 has added a great
variety of cultural patterns to its society, although
tensions and problems have inevitably developed.

The roots

of Israeli culture are firmly planted in Jewish tradition.
This fact is fundamental to the educational system, the
language, and in the general life-style of the country.

The

impact of tradition, however, is not uniform and it impacts
differently upon religious and secular groups.

Each Jewish

community which came to Israel brought with it distinctive
traditions.

Emerging cultural expression in Israel, there

fore, represents a synthesis, still in the process of for
mation, of communal sub-cultures based on the common denom
inator of Judaic heritage.
Various immigrant groups also brought with them
unique identities.

Attempts by these groups to resolve con

flicts of interest with other groups found them shifting to
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ethnicity as an organizing principle through which they could
make claims on the resources of the state.

Specifically,

Israel's ethnic relations can best be described in terms of
two major relationships:

(a) that

between European/Western

and non-European/Oriental Jews, and (b) that between Jewish
and non-Jewish (mainly Arab) groups.
oversimplification.

This is somewhat of an

As noted in Table II, both the European

and non-European Jewish groups are divided into many sub
groups which differ in their language, level of education,
income, life style and other characteristics.

Although such

simplification does not completely correspond to demographic
reality, it does organize meaningfully the complex network
of ethnic attitudes and relationships.

Since the scope of

this paper is limited, relations between Jewish and nonJewish groups will not be dealt with.
Any society is based upon social values.

Such values

are preserved by tradition through generations, bound by
family ties and certain societal groupings.

Western mass

urbanization has undermined the traditional and close human
relationships prevailing in rural and less technological
societies.

Those groups who came to Israel were faced with

the problem of resolving their values with a new modern
society.

Even though they may not have thought of themselves

as belonging to a particular non-Jewish group in their native
country, they soon found identification with an ethnic group
as an important means of protecting their value systems.
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Needless to say, the development of Israeli society has be
come an extensive network of ethnic groups, each protective
of a value system and in conflict with others.
TABLE II
ETHNIC DISTRIBUTION OF THE JEWISH
POPULATION IN ISRAEL5

European Descent

Asian Descent

Total

57%

Total

26%

U.S.S.R.

13

Iraq

11

Poland

17

Yemen, Aden

6

Rumania

11

Turkey

4

Balkans

4

Iran

2.5

Central Europe

6

Others

2.5

Western Europe

2

Others

4

American Descent

African Descent
16%

Total
North America

1%
0.5

Total
Morocco

Central and
South America

0.5

Algeria,
Tunisia

3

Libya

2

Egypt

1.5

Others

0.5

9

5Yochanan Peres, "Ethnic Relations in Israel", in M.
Curtis (ed), People and Politics in the Middle East
(Jerusalem: Keter Publishing, 1971), pp.34-39.
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At this point, we come back to the strategic efficacy
of ethnicity as an organizing principle.6

In the most

natural way, those individuals low on the socioeconomic lad
der who are of similar backgrounds have the best chance of
changing the system, if they behave as a group.

It is as a

group that their struggle becomes not merely negation, but
affirmation; not merely against the norms of some other group,
but in favor of the already existing norms of its own group.
Ethnic groups do often differ as to what is desirable and un
desirable.

By contrast, one of the difficulties of social

class as an organizing principle is that there is not much
conflict of norms between most social classes.
There is considerable heterogeneity within the
Sephardic and Oriental sectors of Israeli society.

Although

many are in the lower socio-economic strata, there are wide
differences in socio-economic status and educational back
ground between immigrants from different countries and be
tween those from rural as opposed to urban regions within the
same country.

Some immigrants came from peasant societies

untouched by any technological development, while others had
already been influenced by modernization before they left.
While these differences do exist, the Sephardic and Oriental
communities tend to regard themselves as underprivileged as

6Nathan Glazer and Daniel Moynihan, "Why Ethnicity?,"
Commentary, Vol. 58, No. 4, October, 1974, page 34.
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compared with the Ashkenazi community, which is seen as the
dominant sector.

With the psychology attendant on feeling

"second-class", communal belonging is accordingly more
central in the consciousness of Oriental communities than it
is among Ashkenazi groups.
Communal "belongingness" among Sephardic and Oriental
groups often manifests itself in the way people associate
with each other.

In their countries of origin, most Oriental

Jews lived in a social structure based upon tribal associa
tions, such as kinship groups or extended families.

Upon

arrival in Israel they sought to maintain such a social
structure as a means of individual and community support
during times of changing environments and values.

This

eventually became a losing battle as nuclear families, char
acteristic of Western environments, became the dominant form
of family structure in Israel.

The changing forms of social

structure certainly provided sources of conflict and tension.
They created instability of norms and values particularly
among the younger generation.

The nuclear family could not

provide the support, moral and otherwise, that extended
families could.

As a result, many within the Oriental com

munity are seeking this support through association with a
larger community of similar ethnic backgrounds, while at the
same time finding themselves in opposition to those of dif-

28

ferent backgrounds.
In spite of all this, one cannot say that the ex
tended family is no longer a significant force in Israeli
society.

Rather, it remains a force finding itself increas

ingly in conflict with other social forces.

In fact, a

typical feature of ethnic communities from Islamic countries
is their adherence to the extended family structure.

Coming

to Israel as part of extended families, they continue to main
tain intensive relations with kin.
This family structure leads to ethnic particularism
with all its social and cultural effects.

Studies have shown

that close social relations outside the extended family circle
seem to be more of a rarity, especially among the adult population.

7

The combination of friends who are relatives and

those who are not provides for a circle of acquaintances
which may be considerable,but hardly varied either in ethnic
affiliation or in the type of relations maintained.

This,

however, is much less characteristic of the younger Israeliborn generation than

of the old-timers.

Problems of intracommunal and intercommunal conflict
in Israel are quite similar to what has occurred in other
developing nations.

While many of the conflicts are either

of a generational or ethnic nature, there are indications
that the major source of conflict is based upon differences
7

Berlier, New Towns, p.144.
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between modern, transitional

and traditional peoples.

In a

study of Turkish society, Marshall Clinard found such intracommunal and intercommunal conflicts.8

He found the lack of

a stable community having norms of behavior recognized and
supported by general consensus made itself acutely felt in
parent-child relationships.

The larger kinship group as a

functioning unit has given way, in the cities, to the nuclear
family consisting only of parents and children.

Furthermore,

occupational differentiation in urban centers has made pos
sible the employment of married and unmarried women outside
the home.

These role changes have invariably altered the

social status of women and affected interpersonal relation
ships both within and outside the home.
Shifts in values, family roles, and community struc
ture do not fully explain the problem of conflict between
Oriental and European groups in Israel.

As with the Turkish

experience, such intercommunal conflicts go beyond ethnicity
to involve those at different stages of the modernization
process.

Clinard defines this process as involving four

variables seen as preconditions for modernization to occur:
(1) cities - which function as urban centers to provide the
physical and

psychosocial conditions that set in motion the

need for modernization and the facilities for bringing it

Marshall B. Clinard, "The Absorption Problem of In8
Migrants," in Noel Gist and Sylvia Fava, Urban Society
(New
York: Thomas Crowell Co., 1964), p.220.
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about;

(2) literacy - preferably based upon a national

education system (uniformity), the literacy rate among the
general population must achieve sufficiently high levels;
(3) media participation - conditional upon literacy, the
population must be involved with media communications net
works to foster information exchange, elements of decision
making, etc.;

(4) political participation - people in a

modern society must be capable of imagining themselves as
part of the political process, making decisions of personal
political involvements at whatever level, based upon their
literacy and media participation.

9

Israel possesses all four variables at an advanced
level, symbolic of advanced modernization.

Consequently,

those portions of the population who are more modern often
find themselves in direct conflict with those groups which
are more traditional.

Those who are modern belong to a

Westernized and urban society; they are literate, consumers
of the mass media, capable of imagining themselves in
varieties of situations beyond their immediate boundaries,
and willing to formulate opinions and make judgments relative
to public issues.

The traditionals, on the other hand, are

illiterate and nonparticipants.

They are incapable of

imaginatively projecting themselves beyond their immediate9

9Ibid., p.222.
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milieu and are lacking in interest or opinions concerning
problems of a community or social character.
The strong kinship structure of Sephardic and
Oriental groups, which provides mutual support to its members,
has helped ease problems of adjustment to changing social and
economic conditions.

At the same time, successful adjustment

by one group often provokes resentment in other groups.

Thus

success for one group may produce disharmony and conflict
in the community as a whole and, more importantly, with those
outside the community of different origins.

Minkowitz con

cludes that:
...changes in the direction of social and economic
modernization sometimes derive from efforts made by
individuals or groups to cope with problems, feuds,
rivalries, aspirations for prestige, etc., which
originate from the older social structure; that is,
the frame of reference in these new activities is
still the traditional setting. While the end
product of this course of events may sometimes be
desirable in terminal modernization, it may also
bring about a vicious circle where modern items may
be absorbed into a traditional setting. Neglect of
this possibility may lead to illusions about the
process of modernization. These illusions may explain
why apparently advanced communities (referring to
rural settlements), which are thought to have made a
good adjustment, suddenly and surprisingly collapse.
It is misleading to take superficial changes for
actual social modernization.10
In spite of the fact that immigration to Israel
called for drastic changes in old social structures, social

10Moshe Minkovitz, "Old Conflicts in a New Environ
ment: A Study of a Moroccan Atlas Mountains Community
Transplanted to Israel," Jewish Journal of Sociology, Vol.
9, 1967, p.191.

32

background has had an immense influence on some important
developments in the new environment.

Settlers arrived with

few possessions and left old environments where often the
occupational structure provided few opportunities for Jews.
They were 'absorbed' by agencies stressing equality in
material support and in opportunities for social and econ
omic mobility.

They were sent to cooperative settlements

which required membership in a larger community based upon
entirely different modes of behavior.

From a society in

which success was based upon kinship relations and social
class, they came to a society which emphasizes voluntary
selection in social grouping and on achievements and qualifi
cations as criteria for social evaluation, mobility, and job
holding.
Previous social structure is elemental in explaining
the attitudes towards present problems of adjustment which
many Oriental and Sephardic Jews developed.

Claims for

economic and political equality are not so much the product
of principles and social ideologies as they are the result
of a desire to compensate for social deprivation in the past
and for the frustration of hopes in the present.

The policy

of equality provided by the absorbing authorities was
adopted by the less successful immigrants as the legitimate
norm in their new environment.

Thus, they view themselves

as only defending their "natural rights" against the more
successful members of society.
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The correlation between lower social class and mem
bership in Oriental ethnical groups is at the root of frus
tration felt by those groups.
sensitivity in the individual.

Discrimination often causes
The person feeling prejudice,

whoever he may be, is never rational and the reaction to
such prejudice is equally irrational.

Some sociological

theory maintains that ethnic conflict is simply the form that
class conflict has been taking in recent decades.

Other

theorists say that ethnic conflicts must be decomposed into
a variety of elements, including colonial conflicts, the
uprising of the "internally colonized", the ambition of
self-appointed leaders, and fashions and fads.

A more

realistic approach to the problem in Israel is to consider
it as part of a system of interlinked developing and deve
loped nations.

As Moynihan and Glazer assert:

"ethnic

identity has become more salient, ethnic self-assertion
stronger, and ethnic conflict more marked everywhere in the
last twenty years.

The reasons include the rise of the

welfare state, the clash between egalitarianism and the
differential achievement of norms, the growing heterogeneity
of states, and the international system of communication."11
The traditional modes of life and feelings of being
discriminated against only serve to isolate Sephardic and
Oriental communities from the mainstream of Israeli life.

11Moynihan and Glazer,

"Why Ethnicity," p.38.
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The isolation is both social and physical, as these groups
usually live in clearly defined districts within a city,
especially Jerusalem.

Social isolationism is reinforced by

spatial isolationism, reducing the type and quality of con
tacts which diverse people in a city will have with each
other.

At least the possibilities of close relationships on

the basis of social equality are greatly reduced.

Instead,

contacts tend to be formalized and confined mainly to the
market place or work situation.

People who work together

on the job or who have contacts of a strictly economic
character may live in entirely different social and sociologi
cal worlds.
There is considerable theoretical and practical
interest concerning the effects of contact on ethnic rela
tions.

Y. Amir has reviewed a large number of studies reve-

vant to this problem and has concluded that the relationship
is complex.12

Contact influences not only the direction of

attitudes but also their intensity.

Initially positive at

titudes, for example, tend to become more positive and in
itially negative attitudes tend to become more negative as a
result of contact.

Attitude change is specific and does not

generalize to all attitudes held by members of ethnic groups
about each other.

12

Improved interpersonal attitudes are

.

Yehuda Amir, "Contact Hypothesis in Ethnic
Relations," Psychological Bulletin, Vol. 71, 1969, pp.319-342.
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observed when there is equal status contact between the mem
bers of the ethnic groups, when the contact is between mem
bers of a majority group and higher status members of a min
ority group, when the contact is intimate rather than casual,
when the contact is rewarding and pleasant, and when the
members of both ethnic groups reach some important goals as
a result of such contact.
Unfavorable conditions for contact include situations
that are competitive, when the contact is unpleasant, when
the prestige of the group is lowered as a result of contact,
when the members of one group are frustrated, when the groups
have moral or ethical standards that are objectionable to one
another, and when the members of the minority group are of
lower status than members of the majority group.
There are probably many approaches to resolving
ethnic conflict in Israeli Jewish society.

All will require

that as people integrate into a country and society

they

will slowly acquire similar cultural, social, and economic
values and skills as a means of fostering communications and
reducing conflicts between various groups.
Social Processes That Minimize Diversity
Ethnic conflict runs deep in Israeli society.

From

the very inception of 20th century settlement in Palestine,
Zionist ideologists were intent on creating a resurrected
Jewish state, based upon a new Hebrew culture and society
but uniquely Israeli.

Ongoing efforts to maintain a common
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culture, therefore, have become an important feature of
Israeli life.

The effort to physically and culturally in

tegrate diverse Jewish immigrants into Israeli society has
met with both success and failure.

The mixed Israeli ex

perience is not due to social processes unique to Israel,
but to universal difficulties in bringing together people of
differing social characteristics.
Acculturation, a long-term process whereby indivi
duals acquire a new social organization, body of knowledge,
and understanding of culture, begins in early stages of
migration to a new environment.

The problems created by

migration and the motives that compel people to leave their
homes and embark upon another way of life are fundamentally
the same everywhere, be it from rural regions to urban
centers, from cities to their suburbs, or from country to
country.
The effort to find a place in a new society usually
creates psychological strain among newcomers.

Bitterness

often arises from a feeling of not being accepted in the new
environment.

The distressed and embittered person often

seeks escape in drinking, in venting hate on the community
or the nation, and in other antisocial behavior.

Some in

dividuals opt otherwise - they attempt to hide their own
ethnicity and move into another group that offers greater
advantages.

This process of absorption is extremely power

ful; in the United States it is still a very important
social process.

Americans become more "American" and less
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ethnic all the time, only to return to being ethnic after
they have achieved some measure of social and economic suc
cess .
In adapting to a new way of life, migrating groups
gradually lose their old way of life.

Through assimilation

minority groups incorporate into the fabric of the new host
society, the end result often the loss of the minority's
identity.

Assimilation, however, does not always result in

a total and inevitable homogenization, nor is it a one-way
process in which the minority passively accepts what is of
fered by the dominant group, thereby losing its own char
acter.

Assimilation, therefore, is the large scale entrance

by ethnic minorities into primary group institutions
(political parties, social organizations, etc.) of the core
society.

Numbers alone indicate that migrants are shaping

the culture of the city as much as they are adjusting to it.
The classic sociological view of the city as an agglomera
tion of a large, heterogenous population in a dense, perman
ent settlement implies not only anonymity but also tolerance
of change.13
Often times the migrants attach themselves to their
own particular cultural minority and re-create, where

13

D.J. Dwyer, "Absorption Problems of In-Miqrants Migrants in Metropolitan Cities of Developing Countries",
Rehovot Conference on Urbanization and Development in Deve
loping Countries
(Weizmann Institute of Science, 1971), p.l.
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possible, the moral and cultural atmosphere of their pre
vious homes.

One tendency is for migrants to group them

selves within the cities according to their prior origins.
The issue is whether previous characteristics can be ex
pected to fade with the passage of time and whether it is
still possible to envisage a one-way adaptation of migrants
to an absorptive urban culture.
Adaptation of migrants is of great importance if
social engineering is to be a goal of physical planning.
One must consider whether it will be necessary or even
possible to achieve residential dispersion in order to stimu
late the absorption of immigrants into the new social system.
The present arrangements, especially the overall housing
situation in major Israeli cities, may have a harmful effect
not only on welfare and working efficiency but also may fail
to provide adequate incentives for constructive social
adaptation or satisfactory new values to replace traditional
goals.
Despite the diverse backgrounds of many social
groups in Israel, there is strong evidence that Israel is
creating a unified, cohesive nationhood.

Ashkenazi and

Sephardi differences are steadily declining and giving way
to an Israeli identity.

The two communities thus converge

culturally and become more similar with each generation.
There are a number of reasons for this convergence.

First,

the integrative impact of a common Jewish religion and
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Hebrew language is deep and tends to override divisive
tendencies.

Second, the dominant political ideologies in

Israel are Zionism, socialism and liberalism.

Zionist

ideology emphasizes (1) the common origin of all Jews and is
directly concerned with the basic objective of overcoming
differences acquired in the Diaspora (countries other than
Israel);

(2) there is a commitment to the absolute and

egalitarian integration of all Jewish subgroups; and (3)

it

perceives Jewish faith in different countries and areas as
essentially the same, and Jews are considered as owing al
legiance to each other.

Another factor involves inter

marriage between members of different ethnic groups, which
is not only accepted but highly valued.

The rise in inter

marriage creates more Israelis, neither Sephardim nor Ash
kenazim.

Intermarriage rates compare favorably with those

in much older heterogenous societies.

Finally, the national

security factor has provided great cohesiveness to Israeli
society.

Israel's involvement in conflict, where survival

was in question, has had a unifying effect for three reasons
interdependence of fate, definition of a common goal, and
provision of an outlet for aggression.

14

Ethnic integration is a process whereby members of a
society, regardless of background, color or cultural dif
ferences, move freely among one another, equally sharing

14 Peres,

"Ethnic Relations in Israel," p.38.
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similar opportunities, privileges and facilities.

Differ

ences arise, however, because individuals do not always begin
at the same starting point.

For an individual to achieve

integration in Israel there must be a measure of desertion
from one's original group and its cultural ethos.

Some

measure of assimilation is necessary to achieve integration
in any society and, certainly, this is not wholly undesirable.
Israel's dominant European social group, driven by its de
sire to create a common cultural identity based upon a
Western model, has operated under a "You can be one of us if
you become like us" attitude.

Such an attitude can lead to

social inequality and discrimination, particularly where the
rights, attainments and privileges of an individual are
clearly affected by the origin group to which one belongs
by birth and, in varying degrees, by conditioning.

Thus,

although one ultimate goal of Israeli society has been in
tegration, assimilation alone could not be relied upon to
attain this goal.

Economic opportunities had to be created

to buttress the integration process.
S.N. Eisenstadt delineated several criteria which
determine the ease of integration and which have particular
significance for the Israeli experience:
1. The motives that induced the immigrants to come to
Israel, and, in particular, their readiness for
change.
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2. The social configurations of the immigration
process, i.e. whether immigrants came in homo
genous ethnic groups or in heterogenous groups
crystallized during the immigration process.
3. The extent of the immigrants' acceptance by the
host population, i.e. the extent of their institu
tional and social integration.
4. The emergence of special ethnic immigrant groups
in various spheres of life.15
The success of any immigrant is partly dependent
upon the openness of the host society, in terms of access to
cultural and economic opportunities.

Israeli society has

remained closed in opportunities accessible to newcomers, in
spite of some sharing in cultural values, particularly of
religion, with old-timers.

While many lower-level economic

opportunities are available to immigrants from non-Western
countries, more lucrative options are scarce.

Of course some

of the predominance of Orientals in lower economic strata is
also due to the immigrants' own lack of readiness for social
change.

At the same time, readiness for change often depends

upon the nature of social conditions in the country of
origin.

Conditions for Jews in most North African countries

were physically and psychologically restrictive so that
upon arrival in Israel their willingness to fill new social

15

Berlier, New Towns, pp.130-131.
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roles was simply non-existent.
The integration of Jewish immigrants into Israeli
society has always presented unique problems.

Jewish iden

tity is at one and the same time both centripetal and cen
trifugal, manifested in concurrent wills to survive as a
nation while wanting to become like other nations.

No im

migrant to Israel is, therefore, only a Jew - this fact is
largely responsible for communal problems in Israel.

Al

though the primary centripetal force revolves around a com
mon Jewish centrality, centrifugal forces are continually
pushing towards different cultural, social and even ethnic
perimeters.
It would be misleading to view Israeli society as
split between two irreconcilable communities, Sephardic and
Ashkenazic.

The importance of these categories should not be

exaggerated, but rather the analysis of subgroups within
these categories provide more useful insights into Israeli
society. For example, many problems are often more indicative
of the difficulties specific strata of Moroccan immigrants
are having than it is of Sephardic communities in general.
Yemenite Jews, skilled artisans and largely literate,
came with their spiritual leaders as a whole community
and had a much easier time integrating.

Those from Morocco

saw many of the more skilled and educated members of their
communities leave for France or North America.

The remainder

who went to Israel felt uprooted from their traditional way
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of life, atomized, leaderless, largely unskilled and illiter
ate.

Well educated Baghdad Jews, the "Franco"--Algerian Jews

or the urban middle class from Egypt have little in common
with Jews from Kurdistan or tribes from the Atlas Mountains
of Morocco.

Similar differences exist between Ashkenazi

Jews, although they are not quite as marked.

Thus, Israel

is a mosaic of various communities reflecting very dissimilar
conditions in their countries of origin.
The experience of integration in Israel involves im
migration to a new country, subsequent movement of people
within the country, and the relationship between the rural
and urban sectors.

There are a great number of differences

between the experiences of immigrants and migrants in Israel
compared to those of others in developing, underdeveloped
and Western countries, yet there are similarities, too.
Differences in the Israeli integration experience
has had significant implications for the planning process in
Israel.

The rural-urban relationship in Israel differs con

siderably from other countries in that the rural sector of
the prestate society never developed dependency relation
ships with the urban sector.

Immigration to Israel, and

ultimately to rural areas, was entirely nonselective.

It

brought people from backward rural areas together with people
from large cities (mostly European).

The usual migrant con

siderations of employment opportunities, social access and
prior contacts with their place of destination did not play
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any significant role in the decision to migrate.

Mass im

migration in the post-1948 period negated the possibility for
gradual absorption.

The immigrants themselves became the

society.
Implication of Israeli Social Structure For Planning
Structuring and the spatial organization of Israeli
society became an absolute necessity.

A national policy of

urbanization and spatial organization had to be formulated
with a number of goals in mind:
1) Settlement in sparsely populated regions
2) Occupation of frontier regions for defense and
political reasons
3) Opening of natural resources frontiers in Southern
desert areas
4) Changing the primary structure of urban development
by limiting the growth of urban concentrations in the
central coastal plain through the establishment of
medium to small size towns in other parts of the
country
5) Building integrated regional systems through creation
of urban service centers within rural regions.16

Arie Shachar, "Development Towns in Israel: Nation
16
al Policy of Urbanization and Spatial Organization" in Rehovot
Conference on Urbanization and Development in Developing Coun
tries
(Weizmann Institute of Science, 1971), pp.89-104.

45

The dispersion of population as immigrants were
absorbed in Israel was attempted by establishing numerous
rural settlements in areas suitable for agricultural develop
ment.

During the twenty year period 1948-1968, 450 rural

settlements were established in Israel, of which 62% were
moshavim (cooperative settlements of individual farm owner
ship) .

The total population living in rural settlements of

all types was 236,954 by the end of 1972.

Growth of rural

population has accounted for nine percent of Israel's total
population increase since 1948.17

Social planning in

Israel's earlier years dealt mainly with the anticipated de
mands for public services in education, health and welfare,
but not in broader aspects of cultural adaptation and social
integration.
Immigrants to Israel have shared the difficulties
similar to those experienced by immigrants to other countries.
There are differences in adaptability, of course, depending
upon the skills immigrants carry with them and whether they
came from rural or urban environments.

For the latter, city

life becomes less stressful since experience was already ac
quired with living in cities.

Urban dwellers also often

possess greater educational and occupational skills than
those from rural or peasant environments.

17 Israel, Ministry of Information, Facts About
Israel-1975, (Jerusalem, 1975), pp.74-75.
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Heavier burdens of adjustment, therefore, fall on immigrants
without urban experience or skills.

This is a universal

experience, as exemplified in a 1956 study of migrants in
Kampala, Uganda:
For the African peasant (moving to an urban area) in
particular, who has been adapted in childhood to work,
comfort and recreation in a comparatively small but
comprehensive face-to-face group, the transition to a
series of discontinuous impersonal relations - with
employers, work-mates, officials, landlords, policemen,
traders and prostitutes - is abrupt indeed. The craft
and other skills acquired in early life are often use
less or at least undervalued in urban conditions. The
early patterns of domestic, kinship and neighborhood
relations are often excluded, while the self-reliance
and group solidarity for shared production and susten
ance under a subsistence economy are little guide to
the foresight, economizing and bargaining required in
the new patterns of wage income and the need to buy
most goods, while unfamiliar modes of expenditure for
livelihood and display are offered and even enforced.18
In any case, the burden of adjustment by immigrant
groups often falls more heavily on the second generation.
The immigrants are protected from the worst effects of dis
organization by having grown up in a traditional culture
whose values still guide their behavior as adults, even
though they have moved to another community setting.

Their

children, however, are caught between the conflicting demands
of their parents' standards and those of the society trans
mitted to them by education and mass media.

The conflict of

values may result in no binding set of norms.

18

Daryll Forde, "Introductory Survey," in Social
Implications of Industrialization and Urbanization in Africa
South of the Sahara, (United Nations:
UNESCO, 1956), p.49.
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The experience of immigrants groups in American
cities indicate that many ethnic communities established in
the 19th century have tended to disintegrate, whereas com
munities established by later migrations are still fairly
distinct.

After the turn of the century, many immigrants

came from Southern and Eastern Europe representing cultures
often at considerable variance from the ones that had become
firmly established.

Arriving fairly late on the American

scene, after most free agricultural land had been acquired by
earlier immigrants and after industrial expansion was well
under way, they crowded into the larger cities, establishing
segregated cultural or ethnic islands in the midst of a poly
ethnic community.

As a result, they found themselves at

severe economic, cultural and psychological disadvantages.
Important conclusions can be drawn from the exper
ience of immigrants to the United States, and probably the
most important is decentralization - a factor of key impor
tance for the future success of ethnic relations in Israel.
Decentralization of ethnic groups is of interest largely
because of its relationship to desegregation and assimilation
into American society.

The classic hypothesis is that as

immigrant groups move outward from the central areas of first
settlement they become less segregated from the native popu
lation.

The underlying dynamic of the relationship is as

sumed to be that they have become assimilated, or more like
the native population in terms of socioeconomic status,
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culture and values.

This implies that as the physical dis

tance between ethnic and native population declines so too
does the social distance.
Decentralization is not necessarily associated with
desegregation, but in the case of immigrant groups they have
gone hand-in-hand.

Similarly, assimilation does not neces

sarily correlate with integration, although immigrant groups
to the U.S. have tended to become more like the native popu
lation.

Abilities in speaking the (new) native language,

citizenship, educational level and intermarriage are charac
teristics related to the degree of residential segregation.
Newer immigrant groups usually score poorly in these areas,
but the important question for Israel is for how long?
Comparisons between the integration of Jewish ethnic
groups in Israel and that of the Jews in the United States
have often been made, but the similarities are really no
closer than that with any other ethnic group in the United
States.

There are, however, some important points for con

sideration.

The Jewish ghetto in the United States has

usually been more a voluntary segregation on the basis of
religion and kinship ties.

Second generation Jews, although

generally better off economically, still lived in "ghettos".
That is, given the areas where they lived, they still carried
on their social life almost exclusively within their own
group.

Thus, the second generation had become assimilated

in terms of living standard but not in terms of social
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relationships.

The third generation is much more assimilated

in terms of living in dispersed, surburban areas, having a
mixture of people in their social groupings and the increased
frequency of intermarriage with non-Jews.
The experiences of East European Jews who went to
Israel and those who went to the United States also provides
some interesting differences.

The former transplanted a

social framework, as it existed in the ghettos of East
Europe at the turn of the century, to a land where it faced
little or no social challenges.

The East European who went

to the U.S., on the other hand, had to face the challenge of
the new society.

In the process he has generally adapted to

the new environment, democracy became a part of him, and the
monolithic society was unacceptable.

It is not surprising

that in the pluralistic U.S. society there exist independent
Jewish social, cultural and educational institutions.
Much of Israeli society, on the other hand, has be
come increasingly monolithic.

Groups from differing cultural

origins do not exist as co-equals, but rather as "superior"
and "inferior", even when the latter forego their ethno
cultural identification in favor of a supposed common culture.
The fault with a monolithic society is that it cannot be
satisfied with just a common culture.

It demands identical

patterns of thought and it imposes the will of one sector
upon another.

By contrast, a pluralistic society makes in

dividual and sectional development not only possible but also
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desirable for the enrichment of the community at large.
Another major aspect of integration concerns inter
marriage among various social groups.

The problem in Israel

is not only how many Ashkenazim will intermarry with Sephar
dim but also how many Iraqis will intermarry with Moroccans
or Tunisians.

It is here that the traditional family struc

ture of the Oriental communities tends to favor endogamy not
only within the broad Oriental community

but also within

specific and narrower groups, i.e. Moroccans marry Moroccans,
etc..

Nonetheless, with rising economic and educational

standards among the younger generation and the emanicipation
of the younger people from the often oppressive parental
tutelage characterizing some Oriental families, the level of
intermarriage between communities is steadily rising.

In

1955, 11.8% of all Jewish marriages in Israel were inter
marriages between European and Afro-Asian partners.

By 1970

the rate of intermarriage was 17.5% of all Jewish marriages.

19

The reason for the rise is that despite some considerable
differences, fundamentally the various communities in Israel
regard themselves as belonging, in both fact and principle,
to a single people with the consciousness of being Jewish a
very strong force.
With rising levels of education and social mobility,19

19
(New York:

Benjamin Neuberger, Israel:
Unity in Diversity
American Zionist Youth Foundation, 1972), p.14.
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pre-Israeli origins become less important while intermarriage
becomes an increasing reality.

This is especially true among

the third generation of Israeli youth who possess relative
independence from parental opinions and who make their own
social decisions.
Summary
Several factors which foster integration have been
explored in this chapter including:
1.

The existence of a body of cultural symbols
which serve as a common focus of identifica
tion by a cross-section of society.

2.

The need for an expanding economy in order for
wide-ranging participation in economic life to
occur.

3.

The perception of a threat originating from a
common enemy.

These factors are of universal application.

Taking

the first two for example, as ethnic groups in the United
States expanded their participation in the country's economic
life, common American cultural symbols became a greater part
of their lives.

In an attempt to become "Americanized",

symbols of ethnic affiliation were submerged.

Gradually

ethnic groups moved out of ghetto-like residential areas,
populated by their own ethnic group, and physical dispersion
became associated with upward economic mobility.
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The assimilation resulting from upward mobility and
physical dispersion among ethnic groups in the United States
has resulted in a noticeable decline in prejudice and dis
crimination against ethnic groups.

For these groups, interest

in and practice of ancestral traditions need no longer be
submerged on account of social inferiority connotations.
The important question is whether Israeli society will evolve
in the same fashion and whether assimilation can be achieved
in the same way by Sephardic and Oriental populations in
Israel.

Subsequent chapters will explore alternative choices

which can direct the outcome of this question.

CHAPTER IV
THE STRUCTURE OF ISRAELI POLITICAL LIFE
The Israeli political system is complex, consisting
of a myriad of parties, splinter groups, associations based
upon country and area of origin, kibbutz membership, and
even army unit.

Israel's political structure has great po

tential for alleviating social problems through offering
representation and participation by disadvantaged groups.
Although the Israeli political system functions quite well
at the local and municipal level, it seems to fall far short
of competency at the national level.

Due to the unwritten

Israeli system of protectsia, support of the status quo has
become so institutionalized that there is little hope for
facilitating the process of integration.
The persistence of social gaps and communal friction
in Israel can, in large part, be attributed to European
dominance in government and positions of power.

Although

this may have been a natural development, it alienates the
Oriental and Sephardic elements, who have a tendency to see
foul play where none exists and deliberate discrimination
which was never intended.
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European dominance in Israeli politics is due largely
to strong political backgrounds in their countries of origin.
The low political profile of Orientals and Sephardis in their
countries of origin was repeated as non-participation in
Israeli political life.

Although certain adults had exper

ience in Zionist youth movements, where they acquired a
certain familiarity with Israeli political parties, they had
not participated in the general political life of their
country of origin.

The proportion of those who had belonged

to a political party in North Africa was very small.

These

immigrants also lacked political experience after their ar
rival in Israel.

They had everything to learn; they had to

become acquainted with specific institutions of Israeli
political life as well as being initiated into exercising
their right to vote.

In this respect the Government did do

a great deal to teach the immigrants the use of their civil
rights.

The Government organizes civic information courses

in development towns and in the moshavim which are intended
to cater to the needs of new immigrants.

Nevertheless,

active use of basic civil rights is still a far cry from
participation in leadership and decision making in political
parties at the national level.
In many other countries differences between the haves
and have-nots are usually explained as class differences.
Israel, the problem turns out to be a communal one.

More

than ninety-five percent of youth and children in distress

In
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(delinquents, runaways, etc.) are from families of Middle
Eastern and North African origin.

Owing to their position

in society and their lack of articulation as a group, mem
bers of this segment of Israel's population remain socially
disorganized.

They are easy prey for political leaders who

seek to control them by ephemeral economic inducements and
advantages which are extended at election time.

Although

they comprise over fifty percent of the population, their
representation in the Knesset (national parliament) and in
Government and national institutions is practically nil, as
the following figures indicate:
1.

In the Sixth Knesset, twenty-four non-Askenazic

members out of 120 possible seats were returned by all the
parties combined.
2.

In the Seventh Knesset, the number was reduced

to eighteen.
3.

In the Eighth Knesset, only twenty non-Ashkenazi

members were returned.20
In addition to the twenty Sephardic members of the
Knesset (out of 120), there are two cabinet ministers
(Health and Police), two directors general of ministries, and
almost no Oriental Jews at higher levels of government lead
ership.

Only three percent of those in the top three civil

20

Elle Eliachar, "Born to Fail:
Israel's Communal
Problem," The Sephardic Voice
(New York: American
Sephardi Federation, 1974), pp. 12-15.
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service grades are Oriental Jews.21

It is significant that

day-to-day policy decisions are made at these levels and
these are the people who supply the information and advice
on which long-term decisions are based.

Since the Sephardic

community lacks representation it becomes clear that their
needs are not actively considered, not because of active
discrimination, but because there is no one present to assert
them.
The presence of some Sephardi representatives in the
various parties of the Knesset is misleading.

Because of

the nature of parliamentary elections in Israel, these repre
sentatives are dependent on the party that chose to put their
names on its list for election.

They are not free to deal

with communal issues, except through the machinery of their
political party.

Nearly all attempts to establish ethnic

parties or to exploit the ethnic factor for electoral politics
have failed.
During elections for the Eighth Knesset (1973) there
were six "communal" lists of candidates contesting the elec
tions and not a single genuine communal representative was
elected.

There are two major reasons for such failures.

In

the first place the constant threat of war unites Israelis
around issues of security and foreign policy, which always

"Oriental Communities in Israel,"
21
December 17, 1971, p.8.

Jerusalem Post,
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pushes social and economic problems into a corner.

Secondly,

the electoral system of proportional representation ties the
electorate to political party lists and prevents any direct
link between the elector

and elected.

Thirdly, the financial

assistance of 170,000 Israeli pounds paid to Knesset members
(for campaign financing) automatically places an incumbent at
an advantage over any new aspirant.

Finally, the party

machinery has access to public funds which can be drawn upon
from various national revenues and international Jewish
contributions.
Local politics in Israel, though far less visible,
is much more innovative and hopeful than the national scene.
Municipal successes of Orientals is due to a higher level
of direct accountability to constituencies.

In many places,

where the Orientals now form a majority, they have ousted
European old-timers.

Sephardi members of municipal councils

have increased from thirteen percent in 1950 to fifty percent
in 1973.22

This resembles a process similar to ethnic take

overs of local politics by bloc voting in American life,
particularly in big cities, at the turn of the century.

Its

consequences for Israel may be equally dramatic.
It will take some time before this shift will be as
visible on the national level of politics since so much

22

Neuberger, Unity in Diversity, p.16.
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political power grows out of provincial smoke-filled back
rooms.

Due to Israel's system

of proportional party repre

sentation, decisions about parliamentary candidates are taken
at the national, central party level and the time lag between
changes in the composition of local electorates and central
party response may be longer than in the Western system of
constituency

representation.

The integration of the Oriental immigrant into the
political structure of Israeli life thus shows many simi
larities with the process through which immigrants became
integrated into the American political structure.

None of

the political alienation and exclusion which, until recently,
characterized the position of the American Blacks can be
found in the process which
undergoing in Israel.

Sephardi/Oriental communities are

Similar to the position which

Italians and Irish had been in the United States, Oriental
Israelis are still at the bottom of the economic ladder.
There still exist many popular prejudices against Oriental
immigrants, but if one looks for American parallels it is
among the Italians and Irish that one would find something
comparable, not among the Blacks.
Many of the difficulties Orientals and Sephardim are
having participating in Israeli political life are due to
the nature of the system itself.

Diffusion of authority is a

major characteristic of the Israeli political style.

It

explains many of the perplexing aspects of Israeli public
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life, such as the amazing continuity of institutions of the
pioneering era, the slow legislative process, the difficul
ties of reform and the permanence with which politicians hold
office, irrespective of mistakes, old age, or senility.
Israelis endlessly complain that they are a mis
governed people. They continually call for abler,
stronger, more effective government. And yet, at
the same time, few people are so suspicious of
authority, so abusive in their attitude to power,
and so adept in the ancient art of circumventing
it.
This dual, and so often paradoxical, approach
to power is a main characteristic of the Israeli
political style.23
Israelis prefer their government to reflect a con
sensus of at least half a dozen political parties, and
national policies are generally a composite of portions of
each party's platforms.

Israel, therefore, is governed by

a plurality of elites who confederate in the national in
terest and for political expediency, remaining always jealous
of one another.

These elites constantly purport to base

themselves on values sacred to Israeli society.

While values

may at times only be veiled greed and ambition, it is also
true that abstract ideas derived from Zionist history are
still a powerful force in Israeli affairs.
Various Israeli interest groups and ideologies have
been represented by many political parties, which have grad
ually consolidated in modern times.

The proliferation and

fragmentation of power in Israel, however, remains an im-

23Elon, Israelis, p. 379 .
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portant factor in the political process.

The most important

power factions contain six major and four minor parties;
major parties are actually coalitions of smaller subdivisions.
These alignments form parties representing labor interests,
the religious establishment, the urban middle-class, pro
fessions, private entrepreneurs and a number of other groups
in society.

Each elite is aided by party-controlled fi

nancial enterprises; each gets a share of public campaign
funds; each has a share in the state bureaucracy and economy;
and each has its own constituency,

tightly organized by well

run political machines.
It is important to note, therefore, that diffusion of
authority is a major Israeli political characteristic.

It

helps to explain the conservatism of a young society, the
longevity of pioneering era institutions, the slow legisla
tive process, the difficulties in achieving reforms, and the
permanence of old-age politicians.

At the same time, it

also is a major reason freedom is maintained in a country
possessing many preconditions for authoritarianism.
The politics of consensus are deeply rooted in the
history of the pre-state period.
They bear witness
to the lingering strength of the institutions and
procedures established early in this century by the
founding fathers. The politics of 1909, or even
1921, affected a few hundred Zionist settlers only;
their procedures survived the age of mass democracy.
The ruling parties of today preceded the state, and
not vice versa, they even preceded colonization.
With the exception of a few splinter groups, the
settlers' parties were founded in Eastern Europe as
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Zionist clubs.24
Israeli distrust of authority allows for an extreme
egalitarianism to permeate public affairs.

It manifests

itself in the Israeli concept of voluntarism (hitnadvut), in
which response to social authority is of a higher order than
state organization and legal coercion.

It is reflected in

the preferential regard accorded to cooperative movements
and the dominant public position of the trade and labor
unions and their subsidiaries.

Unlike other countries,

Israeli unions did not grow out of the national economy.
They actively shared in its creation by establishing
"labor-owned" firms and, like the political parties, they
preceded the state.
Government Bureaucracy
The characteristic Israeli response to social im
peratives before legal ones has an undeniable impact upon
the structure and function of the government bureaucracy,
which exerts a very powerful force upon the direction of
Israeli life.

Israeli bureaucratic organization consists of

a hierarchy of offices representing different levels of
authoritative power.

There is likewise a hierarchy of

statuses in which prestige is distributed among the office-

24

Ibid., p.382.
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holders according to the values assigned to the roles they
perform.

So as with any bureaucratic organization, there is

a system in which rights, privileges, prestige and power are
differentially distributed among personnel.
The bureaucratic organization places a premium on
occupational specialization and most bureaucratic personnel
are expected to perform more or less specialized technical
functions.

Throughout the bureaucratic hierarchy, but

particularly on the lower levels, the emphasis is on routinization of tasks in the interest of efficiency.

The hierarchy

is likewise systematized into a complex of rules and regula
tions that define the forms and limits of power an individual
has over others and this manifests itself in the formation
of bureaus, agencies, departments, etc..
If the central feature of a bureaucracy is formal
organization and a hierarchy of authority and status, within
this framework there is an informal organization in which
relationships between personnel tend to be intimate.

Such

informal organization commonly assumes the form of cliques
and a generally close association between workers.

These

informal relationships constitute important channels of
communication.

They tend to soften the harshness of a formal

organization that emphasizes impersonal relationships,
glorifies efficiency and isolates personnel on different
levels of authority and prestige.
The problem with Israeli bureaucracy is that much of
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its formal power lies at informal levels of authority.

In

formal relationships often make it very difficult for out
siders to enter and allows for lower-level decision making
through benign neglect.

Lower level personnel can prevent

action being taken by screening out and preventing decisions
from reaching the appropriate level of authority.
Bureaucracy, although indispensable in a modern
society, nevertheless represents a concentration of potential
power that threatens existing values.

It may be either a

force for social change or it may harness its forces to re
sist social change, even when it is in the public interest.
Generally speaking, the Israeli bureaucracy is very conserva
tive due to the vested interest of its policy makers.
at the same time both democratic and authoritarian.

It is
While

its lower-level personnel may be selected objectively on the
basis of competence, its policies and practices are authori
tarian in nature, formulated and carried out by a managerial
elite whose behavior lies in party

alliances and directives.

The bureaucracy of Israel is under the auspices of a
Civil Service Commission, headed by a commissioner, appointed
by the Cabinet and responsible to the Minister of Finance.
Present policy is to concentrate on guidance, direction and
supervision, and to transfer routine implementation to the
Ministries, while reserving major responsibilities for senior
civil servants.

Entry preference is given to university

graduates - both posts requiring professional qualifications
and senior administrative positions are reserved for them.

64

A full twenty-five percent of the Civil Service is covered
by professional and technical salary scales with this percentage continually rising.25

While this may be viewed as

a positive development in the growth of the Israeli Civil
Service, it effectively excludes Sephardim, Orientals and
Arabs from policy and decision-making positions at the
senior levels of government, since they are at the lowest
levels of educational achievement.
Israel has experienced a burgeoning civil service
bureaucracy as Table III indicates

(see page 65).

Despite

the official criterion of operational efficiency, the
Israeli bureaucracy is ruled by the concept of le'histader "to take care of oneself" or "to fix oneself up" by bending
the rules to one's purpose.

It is the password through

the maze of authority and regulations, which may be objective
and just, but the needs of the individual are superior.

The

average Israeli recognizes few regulations of universal
applicability.

In dealing with authorities the Israeli de

mands, firmly and loudly, exceptional treatment - he is
usually accommodated.
Several power elites dominate the Israeli public
scene and in all of them power is preserved by the veteran
leadership.

Veterans share a common suspicion of the young,

newcomers, and innovators who call for reforms in the social25

25

. .
Israel, Ministry of Information, Facts About
Israel-1975
(Jersalem, 1975), pp. 101-102.
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and political structures established during the pioneering
era.

Although its very existence is denied, the operations

of the Israeli Establishment are deliberately shrouded be
hind an elaborate edifice of conflicting ideological plat
forms and formal or informal committees, both inside and out
side the Government.

The main function of the Establishment

is to direct the distribution of resources received from
local taxes and from the funds contributed by Jews abroad.
It also controls the assignment of top jobs within the State
hierarchy.
TABLE III
STATE EMPLOYEES, ACCORDING TO MINISTRIES26

Ministry

1952

1959

1972

1952-1972
Increase

President, Knesset
State Comptroller

328

535

677

106%

Interior, Justice,
Police

2,452

3,242

3,769

54%

Foreign Affairs,
Defense

1,427

1,844

2,819

98%

Commerce, Finance &
Agriculture

7,754

9,013

12,150

57%

279

1,440

416%

4,469

8,261

14,622

227%

10,418

14,001

21,537

107%

26,848
1,629,519

37,145
2,088,685

57,014
3,200,500

113%
98%

Development, Housing,
Immigrant Absorption
Health, Welfare, Reli
gions , Education,
Culture
Communications,
Transport, Labor
TOTAL CIVIL SERVICE
General Population

26Ibid.

—
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Elitism in Israeli Political Life
The current Establishment consists of several elites
that emerged in the pioneering period and still dominate the
public scene.

They are largely veteran settlers who came

from Jewish middle-class or lower middle-class homes in
Poland or Russia; most are in their sixties and seventies men in their fifties are scarce and in their forties a rar
ity.

Upward mobility of younger persons in the national

political system is a difficult and painful process.

In the

first Israeli Parliament (1949) the average age of its mem
bers was forty-three, while in the Sixth Parliament (1969)
it was sixty three - indicating the same people were still
in control.

27

Most of these leaders live relatively modest lives,
and their salaries are rarely higher than that of high
school teachers.

Not officially included as income, however,

are numerous privileges provided political leaders in lieu of
money.

They do not hesitate to avail themselves of various

transfer payments which do not appear as income and are,
therefore, rarely taxed.

There are a whole array of allow

ances available in addition to bills incurred privately and
paid for publicly, including the use of a car with a gaso
line allowance, free telephone service for both public and27

27

Edward Geffner, Sephardi Problems in Israel
(Jerusalem: World Sephardi Federation, 1971), p.48.
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personal use, travel allowances and clothing allowances.
Lower income groups in Israeli society are rarely eligible
for these types of in-kind income.

Significantly, these

kinds of "income" are never considered in any statistical
accounting, making it very difficult to develop an accurate
analysis of income differentials in Israeli society.
The elite establishment can be viewed, in a way, as
a mandarin class maintaining a firm hold on the institutions
and instruments of power they have created.

Their patern

alism can partly be explained as the natural reaction of
former revolutionaries,
attained power.

if you will, who have themselves

In theory, members of the Knesset do not

automatically belong to the Establishment nor vice-versa.

In

reality, the candidacy of at least 100 of the 120 members is
tightly controlled by the mandarin class.

The predominance

in parliament of Eastern European pioneers and their off
spring reflects the Establishment even more than the elec
torate.

In the 1969-1974 Knesset, for example, eighty per

cent of its Jewish members were either East European immi
grants or Israeli born children (sabras) of East European
parents.

28

Sephardic and Oriental Jews are not completely disen
franchised, since they have experienced some municipal level
successes.

28

On the national level, however, few have reached*

Elon, Israelis, p.402.
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positions of real power and their success has not been based
on capabilities.

It was the paternalistic attempt of the

mandarins to alter their image of East European ethocentricity without having to yield substantial power.

In gen

eral, Oriental and Sephardic Jews presently are unable to
catch up economically with Ashkenzaim because they do not
hold their share of top government and business posts.
The Protectzia System
The practice of rewarding the loyalty of the party
faithful is commonplace in worldwide politics.

It might be

less offensive in Israel if power would occasionally change
hands.

What makes power brokerage difficult to tolerate is

that there are several very important quasipublic agencies
which run on the same system and in which Sephardi represen
tation is very low.

This pattern runs throughout the Jewish

Agency, the Histadrut and a number of other major public and
private industries and organizations.
In effect, Israel has three governments - the
Histadrut (a national labor union), the Cabinet and the
Jewish Agency.29

In addition a high degree of influence is

exerted on the government by the World Zionist Congress and29

29

The Jewish Agency is an independent, non-profit
organization supported by voluntary dollars of worldwide
Jewry, through its fund raising arm, the United Israel Appeal.
It provides subventions to and deficit financing of Israeli
government social and other non-military assistance programs,
particularly to aid in immigrant absorption.
It operated
under a 1976-77 budget of $502 million (U.S.)
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the Jewish National Fund.

Each has its own unofficial party

affiliation and bureaucracy.

While there are historical

reasons for these organizations and while they do important
work, their continued existence is filled with vested
interests and vast amounts of overlap, duplication of efforts
and organizational infighting.
The Histadrut is the largest labor organization in
Israel with a membership of 1,259,200 in 1973.

Besides en

gaging in basic trade unionism, it worked to build up in
dustry and agriculture and provides social services to its
members.

To a great extent

the Histadrut sets policy in

wages and fringe benefits, health care and various other
workers' rights.

In addition, it controls many of Israel's

largest industries and most of its agricultural business
operations.

The Histadrut is governed

by a twenty-one mem

ber Coordinating Committee, of which only four

are

Sephardim.30
The Jewish Agency has by far the greatest influence
on public life and government policy in Israel.

The Agency

was founded in 1929 and reconstituted in 1971 to include the
World Zionist Organization and all Jewish fund raising
organizations in the world.

Its purpose is to organize im

migration, absorb immigrants, assist them in economic and
social integration, distribute land and provide support for

30

Geffner, Sephardi Problems, p.50.
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new settlements.

The general governing board, called the

Zionist Council, consists of 187 representatives of whom only
six are Sephardim or Orientals.

Of the twelve on the Execu

tive Committee, only one is a Sephardi and he is without
portfolio (not a department head).

Only eight percent of

the delegates to the Zionist Congress are Sephardim. 31
Abuse of power in the Jewish Agency has not continued
without notice.

The Fifth General Assembly of the Jewish

Agency concluded on July 20, 1976 and, surprisingly, a reform
movement is beginning to emerge.

An agreement was reached

on how United Jewish Appeal and United Israel Appeal funds
are to be allocated to the "constructive funds" managed by
the various political parties in Israel.

Supposedly, this

new agreement provides for close and constant scrutiny by
the Agency's Comptroller, but in a July 17, 1976 editorial
the Israeli daily Ha'aretz attacked it as a

cover-up for

the continuation of the same bad situation:

Jewish funds

raised abroad for Israel being funnelled into party (politi
cal) instead of national coffers.
At the same assembly the first public criticism of
the Agency emerged by its own Board of Governors Chairman,
Max Fisher, who called for an end to:
Politicization of job-getting and job-holding with
in the Jewish Agency.
The Agency and its various
services and programs affect the lives of more than

31Ibid.
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600,000 Israelis and it is vital that it have the
best men for the top jobs without regard to their
political or party affiliation. Unfortunately,
this has not been the case.
The point has not been reached where Jewish
Agency officials know that their advancement de
pend solely on their ability and not on extraneous
political factors. The key of party affiliation
still bars able officials within the Agency from
advancing. The party key must be eradicated and
the selection and advancement policies of the
Agency must be based solely on merit.32
One has to wonder how these abuses of power and
control by an elite group, exclusive of Sephardim and
Orientals, continue to thrive.

The whole system is based up

on the Israeli institution of protectzia.

While le'histader

is the rule of life for the average Israeli, protectzia be
comes the rule of thumb for the "above average" Israeli.

It

means that one has friends of influence from whom he can
expect help with any political or bureaucratic problem he
may encounter.

In short, Israel runs on protectzia and the

Oriental communities have none.
Protectzia is also very important in industry and
agriculture, whether public, private or cooperative.

The

system involves more than merely knowing the right people.
It is based upon where one is from, in terms of a specific
region, in certain European countries of origin, what kib
butz one may have come from, the army unit one belongs to,
and what political party one is affiliated with.
32

These

Jewish Telegraphic Agency, Daily News Bulletin,
July 19, 1976, p.2.
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factors become particularly important in the business system
when consideration is given to the awarding of contracts
and securing loans.

Although exact figures are not available,

it is generally conceded that there are very few Sephardim
in the upper levels of the Israeli business world.

Thus, we

get a picture of Sephardim and Orientals as outsiders looking
in at the institutions that dominate Israel's economic and
political life.
It soon becomes clear that this system of favoritism
can only lead to discrimination.

As certain groups are in

cluded in the elite,others must be excluded.

If people

perceive discrimination to exist, the impact is nearly the
same, whether or not official discrimination exists.

This

point of view was conveyed to me during an interview I had
with several leaders of ODED (Association of North African
University Students) at Bar Ilan University, Tel Aviv, on
August 16, 1973 (see footnote 64).

The consensus of this

group was a keen awareness of discrimination.

At the same

time there was recognition that it does not originate from
higher levels of government (prime ministerial level), but
rather is perpetrated at the lower levels of the bureaucracy.
It becomes more a question of people helping their own kins
men and thereby perpetuating the exclusion of non-kinsmen.
Methodological research has borne out the prevalance
of this perception among Sephardic and Oriental Jews.

In a

1973 study of relations between North African Jews and other
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Israelis, it was found that feelings of discrimination were
a significant force among North African immigrants.

The

study was organized on the basis of geographic dispersion of
North African immigrants to Israel and it sampled 782
persons - 325 adults, 247 pupils aged 13 to 18 years, 138
young workers and 82 college students.
the study respondents were asked:

In one portion of

"Do you think that the

treatment of immigrants, whatever their origin, is based on
justice and equality or rather differences and favoritism?"
The following table summarizes the results:
TABLE IV
BASIS FOR TREATMENT OF IMMIGRANTS33

Percentage
Yes

Percentage
No

Percentage
No Answer
Don't Know

Justice

10.2

2.2

87.6

Equality

11.7

3.4

84.9

Differences

23.1

1.8

75.1

Favoritism

49.5

2.8

47.7

Response

It is important to note that the majority of the people in
terviewed refused to respond to the first three items, but
one out of two confirmed that there is favoritism.

33

Those

Doris Bensiom-Donath, "Social Integration of North
African Jews in Israel," Dispersion and Unity - Journal of
Zionism and the Jewish World, Vol. 12 (Jerusalem, 1973)
pp.81-83.
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who replied affirmatively to the items "differences" and
"favoritism" were asked to elaborate and the answers were
regrouped.

(see page 75 Table V)

Most of what has been discussed in this chapter in
dicates a considerable difference between the aspirations
held of integration into Israel and the reality of it.

In a

general sense, one way of moderating the effects of the pat
tern of politics would be recognition by the government of a
plurality of interests and concerns in Israeli society.

A

more tangible governmental recognition involves the placing
of responsibility for policy making in the hands of those who
will be most directly affected by that policy.

To date, the

approach of the Israeli government to solutions of social
problems has been piecemeal decisions sparked by public out
cry.

Such an approach is wholly inadequate.

Tackling funda

mental root problems, such as housing and education, requires
planning and implementation at the highest inter-Ministerial
level with full Parliamentary support.

The fact that so

many Sephardim and Orientals feel discrimination is often
the result of their neglect by official circles and the lack
of clear planning efforts aimed at ameliorating their situa
tion.

While a wide-scale reform of the Israeli political

system would be desirable, this paper seeks to restrict itself
to the existing and possible planning aspects of solutions.

TABLE V
REGROUPED AFFIRMATIVE ANSWER34
A. Percentage
Affirmation of:

B. Percentage Negation
of Discrimination

1) Favoritism - "Ashkenazis benefit" 30.5
2) Differences - "Sephardim not
23.4
treated the same"

1) There is none
2) Justify differences
of treatment

12.5

Sub-Total
Negative

21.5

3) Discrimination
a. affirm existence

D. Total

9.0

17.5
3.6

b. affirm but not personallyinvolved

6.3

c. experienced personally

4.9

d. more in past than now

2.7

4) Justice & Equality but with
reservations
Sub-Total Affirmative

1.8
73.8

34

C. Percentage
No Response

5.3

100.0%

Ibid.
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CHAPTER V
DEMOGRAPHIC ASPECTS OF SOCIAL PROBLEMS IN ISRAEL
Demographic and statistical data can often be meaning
less, being conveniently manipulated to suit a particular
author's needs.

In the case of Israeli society, however,

demographic data does point to some significant ethnic dif
ferentials in the areas of employment, income and education.
This data becomes useful in identifying problem areas.
One can draw a general picture of ethnic differences
in Israel by grouping certain kinds of data.

For example,

there are 120,000 families in Israel who require social as
sistance.

Among these, 72% are of Asian and African origin.

The average age of Oriental Jews in Israel is 30.3 years;
that of the Ashkenazim is 47 years.

Of 643,000 Oriental

immigrants, 94,000 or 14.6% are under the age of 14, compared
with only 31,000 out of 715,000 (4.3%) of European immigrants.
The average size of the Oriental family (4.8 persons) is con
siderably larger than that of the European family (3.1 per
sons) .
Orientals enjoy a much lower standard of living than
Europeans, and this is particularly noticeable in housing.
Whereas only 6.8% of post-1948 European immigrants and 3.3%
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of earlier settlers from the West live with three or more
people to a single room, the comparable figures for Orientals
are 38.0% and 30.7%, respectively.

The minimum density

standard set by the Ministry of Housing, 1.00 - 1.99 persons
per room, is enjoyed by 56.9% and 62.7% of post and pre-1948
European immigrants, respectively.

Only 28.4% of post-1948

and 31.9% of pre-1948 Oriental immigrants live this com
fortably.

The same pattern is reflected in the distribution

of certain household

commodities.

For example, only 52% of

Orientals own a refrigerator, compared with 90.7% of European
families.

From this cursory examination of preliminary data,

one can clearly gather an idea of the dimensions of the
socio-economic problem that presents itself in Israel.

35

Population Growth and Migration
Population growth and migration has had a highly
significant impact upon the problems of planning in Israel.
For the moment, I shall confine myself to several demographic
traits of the North African Jewish community in Israel, since
they comprise the vast majority of those "disadvantaged"
Sephardic and Oriental immigrants which have previously been
referred to.
Between 1948 and 1952 North Africans represented
fourteen percent of the immigration to Israel.
35

While the35

Israel, Central Bureau of Statistics, Statistical
Abstracts of Israel, 1975, compilation from various pages.
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immigration of Asian Jews was almost complete by then, the
North Africans continued to arrive in increasing numbers.
Between 1955 and 1957, 68.7% of all immigrants came from
North Africa; between 1961-1964, 60%; and in 1967, 52% of
the immigrants came from North Africa.

A full twenty-five

percent of the Israeli Jewish population consists of persons
born in North African countries.36
North African immigration has had considerable impact
upon Israel due to the way these immigrants have geographic
ally distributed themselves.
TABLE VI
GEOGRAPHIC DISTRIBUTION OF GENERAL AND NORTH
AFRICAN POPULATIONS IN ISRAEL37
Region

Percentage General Population

Percentage N. Africans

Total North
Galilee
Haifa

30.6
15.2
15.4

36.0
22.0
14.0

Total Central
Jerusalem
Tel Aviv
Central Other

58.2
10.8
29.0
18.4

39.0
15.0
8.0
16.0

Total South
(Negev)

11.2

25.0

As Table VI indicates, there are high concentrations of popu
lation in limited geographic areas.

The concentration of

36Israel, Facts About Israel-1975, pp.71-73
37

Ibid.
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nearly eighty-nine percent of the population in the central
coastal strip and the north has resulted in a distribution
in the supply of services and economic goods which heavily
favors these geographic areas, particularly the larger urban
centers.

Consequently, those areas such as the Galilee and

Negev, where forty-seven percent of the North African popu
lation resides, have not had equal access to these goods and
services.

Settlements in these predominantly North African

areas, therefore, have generally lagged behind the rest of
the country in economic growth and development.
In addition to the problem of population distribution
there exists the problem of extreme densities in certain
areas.

High levels of density result from large urban con

centrations, such as Tel Aviv and Haifa.

Table VII indicates

the magnitude of these densities.
TABLE VII
AVERAGE DENSITY OF POPULATION PER SQUARE KILOMETER38
District

1948

1956

1961

1972

44.2

87.7

101.4

142.5

Haifa

209.2

413.1

433.6

563.0

Central

100.4

263.5

327.8

460.8

1,834.0

3,464.4

4,113.5

5,324.2

159.5

311.1

344.5

540.0

1.5

6.9

12.3

24.9

43.1

88.5

107.6

153.6

Northern

Tel Aviv
Jerusalem
Southern
Total Average

38 Ibid.
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In comparison to Tel Aviv's 5,324 persons per square kilo
meter, London, England has a density of 4,395 persons per
square kilometer.39

The problem of density in Israel is

particularly acute since a high degree of urbanization is
not accompanied by a commensurate level of industrialization.
Thus there is a shortage of employment opportunities relative
to population density.
Israel has had the rather unique problem over the
past two decades of significant changes in the location of
borders, impacting upon the internal arrangement of Israeli
settlements.

While "border areas" are seen as constituting

potential opportunities for population dispersal rather than
strictly security "problems," Israeli settlement policy has
often found it necessary to settle new areas to make them
defensible and to establish a basis for territorial claims.
Israeli settlement policy, therefore, serves multiple func
tions - to establish defense barriers, to "legitimize" an
area, and to disperse population.
To a much greater degree than other population groups,
North African and Oriental Jews have borne the burden of this
settlement policy.

Many of them were settled in areas which

had no natural reason for existance and which functioned at an
extreme disadvantage in competing economically and

39Peter Hall, The World Cities
Hill Book co., 1966), p. 65.

cul

(New York: McGraw
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turally with other areas of the country.

As noted in Table

VI, the percentage of North Africans in the Galilee and the
South, areas which contain the majority of development towns
and border regions, is considerably higher than the average.
The years when these areas were opened for settlement, 195556, coincided with the peak period of North African immigra
tion and, therefore, it was these immigrants who were most
readily available for settlement in these areas.
While the intent of Israeli settlement policy was to
bring about urban deglomeration and to make for a more
rational population dispersal, it has not provided for the
decentralization of such intangibles as cultural assets.
There is a marked disparity between economic investment in
and demographic settlement of border areas on the one hand
and investment in cultural assets in the same regions on the
other hand.

The threat inherent in this situation is con

siderable, since the disparity is self-propagating.
The availability of cultural resources is a primary
attraction for potential settlers whose occupational quali
fications provide a range of choice.

The attraction of in

habitants, who desire cultural opportunities (music, art,
libraries, etc.), to a given area depends on the availability
of cultural assets.

The presence of cultural resources,

therefore, can raise the quality of life in a locale by at
tracting a more culturally enriched population who them
selves add to the resources of the area.

Conversely,areas
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lacking cultural resources tend to lose population groups
who find these resources desirable.

Thus a culturally and

economically deficient population is left behind.

This type

of process, in either the positive or negative direction, is
self-propagating.
while

Enrichment fosters attraction and growth

impoverishment encourages outmigration and decline.
Although in the short-run the economic system might

be regarded as competing with socio-cultural infra-structure
for the allocation of resources, in the long-run a settle
ment's development depends on the standard of education as a
developed economy requires threshold levels of skill and
know-how.

The fact that social and cultural variables tend

to set several self-propagating processes in motion makes it
necessary to pay careful attention to the national distri
bution of cultural resources.

The geographic disparity in

this distribution has created a public image that border
settlements are pockets of lower-class people and areas
having little to offer.

Over time

the image becomes a real

ity and it is no longer sufficient to eliminate the generat
ing factor in order to cancel the image.
Once people get used to the idea that border set
tlements are identified with cultural backwardness it becomes
a major deterrent for new settlers and one of the main causes
of outmigration.
more costly.

Thus, delayed investments are ultimately

Those settlements to which North Africans and

Orientals were more or less forced to inhabit were never
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provided with cultural assets sufficient to attract a heal
thy mixture of population which could have brought economic
and cultural strength to these areas.

These towns, as a

result, have struggled to maintain their viability, often
reliant upon direct government subsidy.
Income Components of the Social Gap
The social gap between Western and Oriental popula
tions in Israel is the result of various factors, both eco
nomic and non-economic.

Since precise measurement of non

economic variables is difficult, conclusions on the social
gap are substantiated mainly on the basis of economic vari
ables.

Such variables include level of income, distribution

of income, and indices of inequality.
In the early 1950's Israel was outstanding among all
countries for the high degree of equality in its income dis
tribution.

Since the 1960's, however, Israel has been grad

ually losing this position of high relative equality.

The

question arises, therefore, as to whether wage discrimina
tion on an ethnic basis exists in Israel.

To answer this

question a comparison of the distribution of incomes of
families of Asian-African and Western (European-American)
origin is provided in Table VIII.
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TABLE VIII
DISTRIBUTION OF INCOME BY FAMILY ORIGIN 1968-6940
Income Classification

Western Families

Average gross monthly
Average monthly per
capita

Asian-African Families

1,116 I.L*

797 I.L.

372 I.L.

159 I.L.

*$1.00 U.S. = 3.5 Israelipounds (I.L.)
in 1969, at time of this comparison

The average gross monthly income of a non-Western
family was approximately 72% of that of a Western family.
This ethnic comparison is even more striking when one con
siders that the average size of a wage earning non-Western
family is five persons, while that of the Western family is
three persons.

Utilizing per capita income the average mon

thly income of Asian-African families is only forty-four per
cent that of Western families.

These figures do not include

"in-kind" income transfers which increase the disparities.
One can quickly surmise two undeniable facts from
this data.

The gap in income is marked and the difference

in family size is a major obstacle to more equal living
standards.

The Israeli government generally defines a

"disadvantaged" family as one with one or more of the follow
ing criteria present:
1.

Wage earning head of the family with less than eight
years of education

40

...
Neuberger, Unity m Diversity, pp.12-13.
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2.

Dwelling arrangements consist of three or more persons
per room

3.

Monthly per capita income of 100 I.L. or less

In 1972, there were 25,000 children from disadvantaged fam
ilies and an additional 45,000 from families just slightly
above these criteria.

It is also significant to note that

of 930,000 Israelis under the age of eighteen, 190,000
(twenty percent) are from families which meet at least two
of the criteria and ninety percent of these are of Sephardic
and Oriental backgrounds. 41
What are the causes of this inequality?

Among

several factors, the most important are:
1.

The gap in occupational levels

2.

The gap in educational levels

3.

Differences in non-wage income

4.

Non-progressive income taxation

5.

Income maintenance
Occupational Levels - A flood of unskilled workers

to the Israeli labor market, a result of mass immigration
in the 1950's, brought about a lower relative wage level.
Income disparities between skilled and unskilled labor
widened with mass immigration, exerting economic forces
which upset the traditional balance of wage policies.
There are a number of other factors besides occupational41

41

Jacqueline Kahanoff,
"Hatikva - The Slum Whose
Name Means Hope," Hadassah Magazine, November, 1973, p.16.
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background which exacerbate the situation.

They are:

1.

The number of wage-earners per family

2.

The number of days worked yearly by the principal
family wage-earner

3.

The amount of property owned by the family

4.

The proportion of income set aside as savings
Educational Levels - In Israel, as in most other

countries, there is a positive correlation between education
and income levels.

At present, Sephardic and Oriental Jews

have a much lower educational level and a lower income level
as compared to European and other Western population groups.
Differences in Non-Wage Income - Although mention
was made of non-wage income in an earlier chapter, it is
important to reiterate two items which contribute to income
inequality:
1.

Individual reparations from West Germany.

These

payments, at the times they were disbursed, widened income
differentials.

In 1970, 10% of all families in Israel

(64,000 families) received restitution payments totaling
$200 million, either as a lump sum or regular income.
ously, all recipients were of European origin.
2.

Fringe Benefits.

Obvi-

42

In higher income brackets, an

important part of real income consists of "in-kind" income fringe benefits which are not officially included as income
(expense accounts, travel, telephone and clothing allowances,

42

Israel, Facts-1975, p.87.
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etc.)-

The proportion of these benefits increases as income

increases.
Non-Progressive Taxation - Purchase or sales taxes on
certain products of necessary consumption weaken the effect
of progressive income taxes and promote income inequality.
They are, however, one of the primary means of obtaining
revenue without increasing other areas of direct taxation.
It is important to note that the problem of income
gaps in Israel is not without hope for improvement.

In the

last decade, the standard of living of Asian and African
families has shown some improvement in relation to the total
population.

While per capita income differentials remain at

unacceptable levels, there has been a closing of gaps in
percentage ownership of durable goods as conveyed in the
following data:
TABLE IX
PERCENTAGE OWNERSHIP OF DURABLE CONSUMER GOODS
BY FAMILY ORIGIN, 1960 - 197043
1960
Western
Families

Item

1970
African/Asian
Families

Western
Families

African/Asian
Families

Refrigerator

69%

17%

97%

92%

Gas Oven

75

43

88

89

Washing
Machine

21

8

42

46

Television

2

2

55

48

Automobile

14

4

19

8

43 Neuberger, Unity in Diversity, p.13.
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Table IX indicates that Sephardic and Oriental
ethnic groups lag behind the level of Westerners in owner
ship of consumer goods.

The disparity between these two

population groups, however, was significantly reduced between
1960 and 1970.

Hopefully, these numbers indicate some

achievement in raising the living standard of the non-Western
population within a relatively short period.
Income Taxation - The social, occupational and educa
tional gap in Israel is largely reflected in the disparity
of the income distribution.

While purchase taxes on con

sumer goods may tend to be regressive, a recently reformed
system of progressive income taxation may have the capacity
to reduce the income gap.

Other instruments serving similar

purposes, to be discussed later, include national insurance
and social service payments.
The concept of poverty can be viewed as the relative
situation of a family compared to others, on an income scale.
Thus, poverty appears as a gap between the lower and higher
income categories.

In 1972 Israeli wage policy fixed the

minimum income level at I.L. 425 per month (national
average = 1,000 to 1,500 I.L. per month).

According to this

policy families with two children at this minimum level
would not be liable for income tax, but would be liable for
national insurance, pension funds and health insurance pay
ments.

The net minimum income for such families, therefore,

is I.L. 363 per month.

In addition, these families often
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receive family allowances paid by employers and the National
Insurance Institute.
A major problem of Sephardic and Oriental families
is their large size.

In July, 1975 the Israeli government

introduced a system of progressive taxation which sought to
increase take-home net income for larger families.

It at

tempts to incorporate a consideration for family size through
the assignment of a point system. 44
According to this reformed system, the percentage of
income deducted for taxes has been decreased.

Personal de

ductions for a citizen and his wife (as a dependent), which
in the past were subtracted from one's income for the purpose
of reckoning income tax, have been abolished; instead points
have been assigned for each family member and their total
value is subtracted from the total tax computed on the gross
income.

Each point is worth I.L. 100 per month.

A man and

his wife are allowed 1 1/2 points each, for each of the first
two children one point each is allowed, a third child is
equivalent to two points, and fourth and fifth children are
2 1/4 points each.

An important change is that payments for

large families (greater than two children) are made by the
National Insurance Institute and are tax-exempt.
An example of taxes on a family with a non-working
wife with three children is shown on page 90.44

44

Association of Americans and Canadians in Israel,
"Progressive Taxation Introduced in Israel," Aliyon,
December, 1975, p.5.
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Total Monthly Earnings
less taxes (25%)
Plus 3 points (husbandwife)

I.L.
+

Net earnings

300
1,800

Payment from N.I.I.
for 3 children
Net monthly spendable
income

2,000
500

400

I.L.

2,200

Fig. 1.
Sample of 1975 Israeli tax reform
as applied to monthly family income.
This point system provides equity for those families who
earn more than the minimum income, but are still at a low
enough level to place them in a tenuous position.

Two aims

of the tax reform are to allow the individual to obtain
proper compensation for his efforts and to allow the govern
ment to distribute the burden of taxation more equitably
among the population.
Despite any tax reform system, there are many who
bear the severe disadvantage of low wage earnings and a
family that is too large.

These families are especially

vulnerable to fluctuations in economic cycles.

Supplemen

tary income and welfare support becomes crucial for these
families.
Income Maintenance - There are more than 120,000
Jewish families receiving some form of welfare assistance
and services in Israel.

Of these families, thirty percent
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receive services without financial assistance, fifty percent
receive various forms of material help, and twenty percent
receive regular economic aid.
The main responsibility for insuring some minimum
level of income rests with the National Insurance Institute.
Payments are made to all families with many children, to
those of low income, and to those temporarily or permanently
unemployed.

In 1974, I.L. 2.8

billion

or 5.7 percent of

the national income was paid for these benefits.
Sectors of the population which are not covered by
National Insurance are covered by the Ministry of Social
Welfare.

The aged, family and child care, rehabilitation,

social welfare and supervision of voluntary agencies are
programs run by this Ministry.

In 1974 it allocated I.L.

525 million for such purposes.

Ethnic differentials are

obvious among welfare recipients.

In terms of continent of

birth, 69.9 percent of recipient family heads were born in
Asia and Africa, twenty-five percent in Europe and the
Americas, and only 5.4 percent in Israel. 45
The Ministry of Welfare is responsible for general
welfare services as well as for those provided via the local
authorities.

This Ministry has a dual function - to provide

services to families and individuals of all ages and to45

45

Jewish Agency for Israel, "Social Welfare in Israel
- Changing Trends and Approaches," Unpublished Report,
Jerusalem, February 1973.
(Photocopied).
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promote community development.

Those services which are

intended directly for family and individual assistance are
delivered by local authorities under Ministry supervision.
The 1958 Israeli Welfare Services Law established
definitions and guidelines for the distribution of welfare
service, but did not legally establish the citizen's right
to receive such aid.

In other words, the Israeli welfare

system never formally adopted the principle that every
citizen is entitled to aid in case of need.

The same type

of thinking, which never established the right to receive
aid, also set the schedule of support payments to provide
income that is lower than the fixed minimum wage.

This

disparity, as indicated in Table X, reflects the policy of
stimulating welfare recipients to seek income from wages,
even though the minimum wage is low.
TABLE X
RATES OF WELFARE PAYMENTS, 1972
(in Israeli Pounds per month)46

No. of People
in Family

N.I.I. Definition
of Poverty Income

Social Welfare
Rates

Avg. Wage,
Full-Time
Unskilled Labor

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8

I.L. 126
210
283
346
399
441
483
514

I.L.123
193
251
300
342
382
422
462

I.L. 330
340
353
365
378
390
404
419

46

Geffner, Sephardi

Problems, p.8.

93

While the rate of welfare payments varies between
eighty-six percent to ninety-eight percent of the definition
of poverty for a particular category, welfare recipients
receive additional assistance in the form of medical insur
ance, food surpluses, help in purchasing domestic equipment
(appliances), income tax and compulsory loan reductions, free
educational services and assistance with rental payments.
A final word of explanation is due concerning the
National Insurance Institute, founded in 1954 by legislative
act.

National Insurance, similar to U.S. Social Security,

was made compulsory for the entire Israeli population from
the age of eighteen until eligibility for old-age pension is
attained.

While it covers a broad range of the population,

it is not specifically directed at solving the economic and
social problems of the needy.

Benefits are given to all

those insured, according to criteria which determine their
rights.
Of general importance, National Insurance provides
income supplements to a number of deprived sections of the
population, particularly families whose supporters earn low
wages and have many children (Fig. 1).

In a sense, such

families are guaranteed a minimum income through various
means, while the purchasing value of this income is safe
guarded by payment adjustments linked to changes in the con
sumer price index.
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Educational Integration of Social Groups in Israel
The dilemma in Israel today is whether social develpment of all sectors can be attained and whether it may be
too costly.

Obviously, the social gap is still the biggest

internal problem Israel faces, and it is felt most in housing
and education.

While housing will be discussed in the next

chapter, there have been certain recent developments in the
educational system which exacerbate an already poor situation.
Among a number of cost-cutting measures, the Israeli
government is considering the elimination of free tenth grade
education.

In addition, the cost of pre-school tuition

averages I.L. 500 per month, or half of what most working
mothers earn.

Average high school fees now stand at I.L.

3,500 per year, or two months net wages for most workers.
University budgets have been cut and tuition averages I.L.
4,933 per year, a sum most families are unable to afford.
With this background in mind, it is important to realize
that in 1976 education comprised the third largest item in
the Israeli national budget, serving one million pupils.
Education is tuition-free and compulsory between the ages of
five and fifteen and jointly financed by State and local
authorities.47
Primary education is limited to six years followed
by six years of post-primary school up through grade twelve.

47
United Jewish Appeal, Education in Israel,
Statistical Brief, (New York: UJA, 1976), p.2.
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Fees in secondary schools (grades 10-12) are approximate
ly I.L. 3,500 per year with State subsidies available
to some parents.48

About 56.3 percent of all secondary

pupils are exempt from some payment, with a large portion of
the cost difference being assumed by the quasi-public Jewish
Agency.
The number of school children from large families of
Asian and African origin represents a majority, sixty percent,
of the elementary school population.

Their proportion in

the school system is larger than the number of African and
Asian Jews in the national population.

After twenty-seven

years of educational experience in Israel, a new reality has
developed which casts doubt on the principle of equal educa
tion for all.

Many new immigrant children from underdevelop

ed countries have acquired the simplest

skills of reading

and writing only with the greatest difficulty.

They have

fallen steadily behind in levels of educational attainment as
reflected in Table XI,

The poor record of comparative

achievement for Asian and African pupils as shown in Table XI
is only part of the picture.

As of 1973, students of Asian

and African origins in institutions of higher education com
prise only thirteen percent of the student population, four
percent of the B.A. degrees awarded, eight percent of those
enrolled in M.A. and doctoral degree programs, and only 1.6

48

Israel, Facts-1975, p.149.
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percent of those receiving M. A. and Ph.D degrees. 49
TABLE XI
RATE OF EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT FOR JEWISH
PUPILS ACCORDING TO ORIGIN,BY
PERCENTAGE, 1967-1970*
50

Completed
Grade 8

Completed
Grade 9

Graduated High
School
(passed exams)

Origin

Began
Grade 1

Asia/
Africa

100%

90.5

72.0

23.0

6.0

Western/
Israeli

100%

95.5

95.0

63.0

35.0

Completed
Grade 12

Table XII compares university enrollments of students
from thirteen older towns to those from twenty-five develop
ment towns (excludes major cities).

Older towns in Israel

have very high populations of Ashkenazim and European parent
age sabras (native-born Israelis), while the population of
development towns consists more heavily of Sephardic and
Oriental Jews.

It is interesting to note that while overall

enrollment from developmant towns is twenty percent the en
rollment from older towns, enrollment at Ben-Gurion Univer
sity in Beersheba exhibits the reverse of this pattern.

49

. .
Israel, Ministry for Foreign Affairs, The Black
Panthers in Israel, Background Paper E/8, 1973, p.2.
50Israel, Central Bureau of Statistics, Students in
Academic Institutions, 1969/70, Special Publications Series
No. 345, 1971, p.14.
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Here the enrollment by older town residents is 54% that of
development town residents.

Ben-Gurion University is an

example of a planned government attempt to upgrade the educa
tional opportunities of economically deprived Oriental
students, partly by locating the school in proximity to the
development towns where these students reside.
TABLE XII
STUDENT POPULATION IN MAJOR ISRAELI INSTITUTIONS, BY
RESIDENCE, 197051
Older
Towns

Development
Towns

1,644

139

Ben-Gurion University
(Beersheba)

136

252

Haifa University

256

165

Hebrew University
(Jerusalem)

1,828

601

Technion
(Haifa)

1,298

286

Tel Aviv University

2,239

119

144

9

7,755

1,571

Institution
Bar-Ilan University
(Tel Aviv)

Weizmann Institute
(Rehovot)
TOTAL

The Government established Ben-Gurion University in
1969, after a study of national needs, to help spearhead the
development of the Negev area.

51

Beersheba was chosen as a

Berlier, New Towns in Israel, pp.158-159.
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site due to its proximty to the Negev (Southern desert)
region and because it is one of Israel's main centers for
absorbing new immigrants.

The University is an integral part

of the absorption facilities in the area.
Ben-Gurion University has a unique national role to
play in educating the large proportion of disadvantaged
youngsters in the Negev area.

The population of the Negev

is seventy percent Sephardi and Sephardi students comprise
twenty-five to thirty percent of the 4,500 students, or
twice the national average.

The University's policy of

serving primarily as a community oriented center of educa
tion will lead to a planned increase in the number of
Sephardi students.

As an example, the University has a

preparatory school program which trains culturally deprived
students and high school dropouts to specialize in subjects
related to technology and science.

It also attempts to

bring them up to general university standards in other
academic disciplines.52
The relatively low achievement level and high drop
out rate among Asian and African children can generally be
attributed to a number of environmental variables such as
poverty, educational deprivation in the immediate surround
ings, and limited family cultural background.

52

Furthermore,

Simson Carlebach, "Desert University," The
Jerusalem Post, October 19, 1976, p.ll.
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the cultural upheaval often involved in immigration from an
Oriental to a Western culture has also had a significant
impact.

As a direct result of this "clash" of cultures,

the absorbing society contributed to educational failures
among Sephardic and Oriental children.

Despite concerted

efforts, study curricula and teaching methods employed in
Israel's educational system were not adapted to the vast dif
ferences between pupils of different backgrounds and teachers
lacked adequate experience and training to respond to the
difficulties of these immigrant children.
In recent years a number of changes in Israeli
educational thinking have occurred, mainly in terms of ques
tioning assumptions on the superiority of the absorbing
culture.

Similarly, the validity of the principle that

education ought to be egalitarian and uniform has been chal
lenged.

With the notable example of Ben-Gurion University

as a case in point, Israeli educators have begun to devote
more attention to equality of educational opportunity rather
than uniformity of education.
More important than increasing opportunities at the
university level is doing so at the elementary level.
Israel's Ministry of Education and Culture has implemented
a number of special programs to raise educational levels
and opportunities for Asian and African pupils.

They include:

a. Free elementary studies (8-9 years) for all;
free secondary school studies for under
privileged children - 77.4% of children who
do not pay fees are of Asian and African
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origin; enrichment syllabuses in arts, the
theatre and music for children whose natural
environment does not stress such values
(7,300 benefited in 1972/73).
b. A longer school year for such pupils.
c. A longer school day for 71,000 pupils in
1973/74 and hot lunches for 210,000.
d. Special tutoring.
e. Special annual grants for textbooks.
All this is meant to constitute a continuous flow
of support to children from the age of 3 up to grants
and loans at universities; the purpose to create equal
opportunities, and not merely equality of treatment.53
As a result of changes such as these, the concept of
"disadvantaged" or "deprived" defines children in need of
relatively intensive educational care due to some form of
so-called cultural deprivation.

This concept is an Israeli

innovation and was developed out of educational work in the
particular situations of an immigrant absorbing country.
Cultural deprivation, nevertheless, implies one culture is
inferior.

In fact, the deprivation is actually economic,

with Asian and African families lacking the economic means
or goals for self-advancement.

While new Government educa

tional programs are anticipated to have widespread impacts
on equalizing educational opportunity, their effectiveness
remains to be proven.

53

Israel, Facts-1975, p.151.
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Manpower Resources in Israel
Differing origins and socio-economic characteristics
of immigrants influenced the occupational mobility of African
and Asian Jews upon their arrival in Israel.
of these Jews as a monolithic population.

One cannot talk

The economic suc

cess of each group was predicated by the particular con
ditions in the country of origin.
In Morocco, Jews were mainly artisans and small
traders.

In Tunisia and Algeria, Jews had been craftsmen,

commercially employed persons and, in modern times, clerical
workers and liberal professionals.

These clericals and pro

fessionals required advanced education based upon French
culture and educational methods.
ties for adapting to Western life.

This provided better abili
A large portion of this

educated Tunisian and Algerian Jewish population preferred
emigration to France.

Those who came to Israel, the crafts

men, generally lacked the skills for economic integration
into a new society in the process of industrialization.
Without clear occupational skills, the masses of
immigrants to Israel posed serious problems.

While some

could be integrated into the rural sector and others into
the urban working class, mass immigration brought about
radical transformations in the structures of the North
African communities.

The immigrant often rejected trans

formations that were imposed by the demands of a developing
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Israeli society, preferring to attribute them to discrimina
tion .
In any society there is a threshold of educational
capital and skilled manpower levels below which a settlement
cannot exist.

Without a mix of manpower resources in a

given area, pockets of extreme deprivation develop.

In the

industrialized countries, a highly developed division of
labor is found.

There is a range of specialization which

expands in line with the demands of technological progress.
In such cases, the main manpower problem is to increase the
levels of diversification.

In developing countries that are

just beginning to industrialize, the manpower problem be
comes that of inculcating initial specialized skills in line
with new industrial plants.
Due to high levels of immigration within a relatively
short time, Israel is unique in that it does not fall into
either of the above categories.

While Israeli industriali

zation is in full swing, its labor force is characterized by
a highly polarized occupational structure.

On the one hand,

there are masses of immigrants from underdeveloped countries
who are not attuned to modern industrial production.

Many

of them are illiterate or poorly educated and lack vocational
training.

On the other hand, there is a cadre of immigrants

with a high level of professional training and skill who are
prepared to move into skilled trades and management positions.
Israel has wide geographic variations in terms of
industrialization and development.

Those areas which were
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underdeveloped and exhibited deprivation, such as develop
ment towns, found that their major problem was a lack of
skilled workers and professionals.

Government attempts at

rehabilitation never worked because most of the initiative
came from above and little from below.

As a result, small

and medium-scale industry and services did not develop.
Israel has moved through a transition period between
stagnation and development in its attempt to cope with im
migration from abroad as well as internal migration, both of
which created demographic pressures on Israel's employment
structure.

When Israel, a country of small population,

absorbed a high proportion of immigrants, it became neces
sary to adopt a policy of maximum manpower utilization
through the institution of what is termed "rapid reserves."
This was roughly equivalent to a combination of the Civilian
Conservation Corps during the Depression era in the United
States and a private employment bureau.
The utilization of these reserves was born out of a
need to provide jobs for all immigrants and to develop a
given technical production capacity.

The system was advan

tageous because large numbers were activated for the labor
force, including many who had never worked before.

The need

to provide the newcomers with the minimum means for exis
tence, however, became a barrier to specialization.

While

it has been essential for Israel, as a developing country,
to place theoretically equal emphasis on maximal exploita-

TABLE XIII
ISRAELI EMPLOYMENT BY ECONOMIC BRANCH, 1968-1972
(In Thousands and Percentages)54
Economic
Branch

1969

1968
No.

No.

No.

No.
9.7%

84.8

1972

1971

1970

8.8%

84.5

No.
8.5%

83.5

8.0%

94.3

10.3%

91.3

Industry &
Mining

217.6

23.9

226.1

23.9

233.3

24.2

239.6

24.0

248.4

23.8

Electricity
& Water

11.6

1.3

10.6

1.1

11.3

1.2

11.0

1.1

9.0

0.8

Construction

72.9

8.0

75.9

8.0

80.1

8.3

88.3

8.9

99.3

9.5

Transportation
& Communication

68.4

7.5

74.7

7.9

72.2

7.5

74.0

7.4

76.9

7.4

Commerce Hotels
& Restaurants

120.4

13.2

125.0

13.2

125.0

13.0

126.4

12.7

137.0

13.1

Public
Services

205.4

22.6

213.9

22.6

230.3

23.9

241.3

24.2

252.5

24.3

Finance &
Other Service

120.3

13.2

128.3

13.6

126.5

13.1

132.0

13.2

136.4

13.1

TOTAL

910.9

100 %

945.8

100 %

963.2

100 %

997.1

100 %

1,047.0

100 %

54
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Agriculture
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tion of available manpower and on large capital investments,
the waves of immigration at various periods intensified the
need for the former.

As experience has shown, such emphasis

did not solve the basic problem of many deprived areas - that
of professionalization.

The utilization of rapid reserves

brought about full or almost complete employment, but it
often served to conceal the invisible unemployment, such as
relief work, and the basic lack of skills in the labor force.
While patterns of employment in Israel, by type of
activity, remain relatively stable, the pressures on man
power due to shortages of skilled labor and professional
management have increased.

While Table XIII illustrates

general employment in Israel, it does not say anything about
ethnic differentials by type of employment.

Table XIV, on

the other hand, illustrates the predominance of Asian and
Africans in "blue-collar" occupations (the latter three
categories) while Europeans and North Americans predominate
in professional and "white-collar" occupations.
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TABLE XIV
PERCENTAGE EMPLOYMENT IN ISRAEL, BY CATEGORIES,
ACCORDING TO ETHNIC ORIGIN, 197255
Employment
Category

Asian/African

European/N. American

Total Work Force

34%

43%

Professionals

16

50

White Collar

19

54

Construction

53

32

Industrial

41

38

Service

48

37

Key variables that determine levels of occupational
and income achievement are length of residence in Israel,
the educational level of the household head, and increasing
ly, the education of other family members.

Widening educa

tional opportunities in Israel does offer hope for a more
equitable sharing of occupational opportunities by all
segments of Israeli society in coming years.
The importance of ethnic influence on the Israeli
economy stems from the fact that a modern economy is not
constituted solely by means of material resources; for its
operation, it also needs a well consolidated social and
cultural structure.

55

Israel, Black Panthers, p.4.
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The approach which regards large capital invest
ments as the magic solution to the problems of
underdeveloped regions is incorrect.
In most
cases advancement will not be attained if the
necessary attention is not devoted to raising
the professional level of manpower. It is all
the more necessary to pay attention to this
aspect when the lives of the persons employed
are themselves inadequate. When their education
is faulty and the regional development is un
balanced, when there are slums and the health
services are insufficient, when cultural oppor
tunities are unequally distributed, and there is
neglect of entertainment facilities it is still
more obvious that priority must be given to
education, slum clearance, better health service
and development of backward areas.
If it turns
out that it is these aspects which account for
unemployment and retardation in economic growth,
there is every justification for unemployment and
economic growth not being regarded as top priority.56
While the Israeli Government publicly claims to be
making advances into those areas mentioned by Galbraith,
there are wide variations in the realities of individual,
neighborhood, and community advancement in raising levels of
personal, economic and cultural growth.

Successes in such

advancement and growth, therefore, depends upon the motiva
tions of the people who are themselves seeking (or not seek
ing) to advance.

56J.K, Galbraith, "The Science of Economics vs.
Human Needs," The Economic Quarterly, Nos. 45-46, 1965, p.15.

CHAPTER VI
SOCIAL AND PHYSICAL PLANNING LINKAGES IN ISRAEL
The Relationship Between Physical and Social Problems
in Israeli Urban Environments
An unbalanced distribution of population and urban
centers has posed serious problems for planning in Israel.
Where centralization of human activities has its advantages,
unplanned development negates them.

A hierarchy of rural

communities, regional commercial centers, and national urban
centers is a system which provides greatest opportunities for
economic and social progress and easing of social intergration.
With exceptions, Israel has been largely unsuccessful in its
attempts to establish a hierarchy of human settlements.
There are three types of social problems associated
with urbanization:

(1) those that stem from the inherent nature

of the urban life style,

(2) those that arise from a transfer,

through migration, of rural problems-poverty, illiteracy, unemployment-to urban areas where they become more conspicuous, and
(3) those that result from the process of rapid change inherent
in urbanization.

Thus, social problems are created by increase

in physical numbers, more congested living, more complex social
institutions, and by the difficulties of transition from the
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rural to the urban way of life.
Social problems associated with urbanization have
had great impact upon Israel.

Due to the absorption of large

numbers of immigrants, temporary settlements were construct
ed during the earlier waves of immigration to cope with the
large and sudden influx of people.
of these settlements was

The exact legal status

always unclear.

Depending upon

time of arrival, immigrants were housed in a variety of dwel
lings.

Large numbers were housed in small, asbestos covered

buildings.

While these housing provisions were originally

intended as temporary, allowing the immigrant a transitional
period while adapting to a new environment, the temporary
gradually became permanent.

These settlements could be

found in rural areas, development towns or within major
cities.

Subsequently, a family of six living in a one or

two room dwelling originally intended for two or three per
sons became commonplace in these settlement areas.
Another type of transitional settlement, largely a
problem in areas surrounding Jerusalem, are squatter colonies
resulting from wars.

Following Israel's wars of 1948 and

1967, certain areas which were under Arab control were
vacated.

These areas contained a large proportion of sub

standard housing, usually in the form of old hotels or apart
ment buildings, damaged by shelling and subsequently condemn
ed by the Israeli government.

Large numbers of Israeli Jews,

particularly slum-dwelling North Africans, quickly moved in
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as squatters; attempts by the government to remove them
failed and many remain to this day.
The term "transitional settlement" embraces many
forms of slums, squatter settlements, and other uncontrolled
environments.

These areas are transitional in the sense

that their inhabitants are undergoing a social and economic
change as they adapt to an urban economy.

The effective

land use of these originally temporary settlements have now
assumed a permanent residential classification.

People who

continue to populate these areas intensify planning problems
by increasing living densities in central low-rent and lowincome areas and by invasion of vacant public and private
land, typically in peripheral areas, which impedes efforts
required for long-term improvement and development of these
lands.
While it may be desirable for transitional areas to
be vacated, their continued occupation by large numbers of
poorer immigrants is a function of benefits produced.
provide their inhabitants:

They

housing at rents within the

means of the lowest income groups; informal reception centers
for newly-arrived immigrants, easing their adjustment to
urban life; employment in marginal and small-scale enter
prises; accommodations in close proximity to place of employ
ment; and adequate social support during unemployment and
other periods of difficulty.
Transitional settlements, while not isolated to a
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particular region in Israel, have significant impacts upon
Jerusalem and Tel Aviv,

Conditions of distress created by

transitional areas, however, prevail in other areas as well.
Whether in development towns or in large cities, poor con
ditions have been created by immigrants left to their own
devices.

Often immigrants settled in neighborhoods based

upon common periods of arrival and/or country of origin.
These bases for neighborhood organization, therefore, did
not favor positive intergroup social relations, integration,
or economic advancement of disadvantaged groups.

Conditions

of distress and deterioration, therefore, came to prevail in
three types of areas:
1.

Certain development towns.

Some development

towns are distressed, especially those located a considerable
distance from established urban regions.

These towns lag

behind in basic municipal services and cultural resources
are limited to only occasional contact between the town's
inhabitants and Israeli institutions.
immigrants and veteran Israelis

Relations between

and between people of dif

fering national origins are often tense.

Economically dis

advantaged towns also have difficulty maintaining population
since residents leave as soon as they find better opportuni
ties elsewhere.
2.

Pockets of distress in established settlements.

Pockets of distress are older sections of rural or semi-urban
settlements.

These pockets were temporary "dumping grounds"
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for immigrants in the early years of the State, much like
transitional settlements in urban areas.

As the settlements

in proximity to these pockets established themselves, develop
ing economically, residents of distressed areas, lacking
skills and not having been absorbed into the mainstream of
Israeli society, became locked out of the economic and social
life of the settlements.
3.

Distressed neighborhoods in large cities and on

their outskirts.
salem, Tel Aviv

In the three large urban centers of Jeru
and Haifa, integration poses problems dif

ferent from those in the two aforementioned areas.

North

African immigrants frequently settled in very old neighborhoods or in katamon quarters.57

In Jerusalem they were hur-

ridly constructed to accommodate mass immigrant arrivals.
These quarters at times can be found in close proximity to
affluent neighborhoods, exacerbating feelings of deprivation
and frustration and sometimes leading to violence and crim
inal behavior.
Housing Problems In Israel
The combination of short supply and high cost of
housing in Israel has caused overcrowding, impacting on
middle and upper-income families as well as the poor.

57 The Hebrew word katamon literally means "district."
While comparisons are difficult, connotations in common usage
are akin to the American concept of a hard-core inner-city
slum or a skid-row area.
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The problem transcends regional distinctions.

The shortage

is felt in urban centers, development towns and rural areas.
Mass migration and rapid urbanization created a de
mand for housing that far exceeded the supply.

All types of

housing were in demand, even sub-standard dwellings.

Con

centrations of low-income populations were forced into slums
where living conditions are characterized by deteriorated
buildings, high population density per unit, concentrations
of populations having similar ethnic origins, high frequen
cies of welfare, crime, and broken families.

Public services

are unavailable or insufficient in these areas and there is
a high incidence of depression and isolation among inhabi
tants.

Other city residents look at these areas with disdain,

as do the slum residents themselves.
While there has been a steady improvement in housing
conditions in Israel over the years, it has not been felt by
the entire population.

The system of public housing has

succeeded in increasing the average size of apartments from
thirty-one square meters (334 sq. ft.) in the early 1950's
to about seventy-five square meters
early 1970's.58

(807 sq. ft.) in the

There has also been considerable improvement

in the structural quality of housing since 1950.

Although

available units have improved, the major problem of supply
shortages remains.

58

Geffner, Sephardi Problems,pp. 17-24
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The reasons for Israel's housing shortage vary from
the technical to the political.

In addition to natural popu

lation growth, Israel adds about 40,000 new immigrants per
year to its population.

Furthermore, the need to replace a

significant percentage of existing substandard housing units
increases the demand.

When this is added to the construction

of public buildings, industrial plants and commercial space,
the result is a limited labor force not able to meet these
needs.
The high cost of housing, partially due to demand,
is driven upward by government land policy.

Due to Israel's

Socialist history, the scarcity of land and the need to care
fully control land development, the government is the owner
of most land suitable for housing.

Government practice has

exhibited a reluctance to release land in large parcels and
instead

has favored land appropriations on a piecemeal,

short-term basis.

Thus, a continual shortage of lots has

resulted in an escalation in housing costs.

Furthermore,

property tax policy falls more heavily upon buildings than
land.

This encourages private landowners to withhold lots

for development until market prices rise sufficiently for
owners to realize a substantial profit.
Housing has been a tremendous burden on the Israeli
economy.

Although in the long-run it is an essential part

of the social cost of development, it is inflationary in the
short-run.

Housing expenditures involve large sums expended
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on materials and labor without an immediate return in the
form of consumption or export goods.

Inflationary pressures

and resultant high interest rates have made it extremely
difficult to construct housing at reasonable costs without
heavy government subsidies.

Most housing has to be purchased

and, despite government assistance in the form of credits and
subventions, the purchase of decent housing is beyond the
reach of the poor.

Israel has an economy with considerable

governmental intervention.

Housing problems, therefore, may

be viewed as a failure in policy to control costs through
regulation and manipulation of vast land resources and
through construction contracts that are awarded by the
government to private contractors.
With this background in mind, a picture emerges in
which social problems and distress in urban neighborhoods
may be attributed to two major factors:
1.

The various relief services in the country are

ineffective in solving the total complex of problems, par
ticularly those involved with the creation of an infrastruc
ture for social and community services.
2.

Poor neighborhoods are islands of physical,

social and economic neglect in the midst of comparative
prosperity.

The proximity of two opposite lifestyles deepens

the sense of helplessness and anger in the distressed popula
tion .
Degrees of neglect and of social and economic gaps
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between different populations in Israel vary greatly,
whether between one urban neighborhood with another or be
tween one region of the country and another.
studies will be examined:
Gat in the Lachish Region.

Two case

Nahla'ot in Jerusalem and Kiryat
The former is a Jerusalem neigh

borhood which typifies neglect and inefficiency of services
as a major source of problems, while Kiryat Gat and the
Lachish Region represent directed planning aimed at achieving
viable solutions to social and economic gaps in Israeli
society.
The Nahla'ot Quarter In Jerusalem,
A Distressed Neighborhood
The development of Nahla'ot, now a distressed neigh
borhood in Jerusalem, has been closely linked to the growth
of modern Jerusalem.

According to Shlomo Gadish, Deputy

Mayor of Jerusalem, many modern-day planning problems stem
from the varied origins of Jerusalem's Jewish population. 59
Prior to 1948, Jews on both the east and west sides of the
city shared the same facilities, services, and infra-struc
ture, all of which were relatively poor, but after 1948 dis
parity developed between the Jordanian (east) and the
Israeli (west) sides of the city.

A population migration,

mostly of Jews, took place as people sought the better ser
vices and facilities available on the Israeli side of the59

59

Interview with Hon. Shlomo Gadish, Deputy Mayor of
Jerusalem, Hotel Reich, Jerusalem, August 20, 1973.
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city.

In addition, between 1948 and 1952

the Israeli

government moved new immigrants directly to Jerusalem in
order to fortify the Jewish population, and many were placed
in unfit housing.

The combination of these two population

movements together with a third - voluntary migration due
to the spiritual attraction of Jerusalem - has resulted in
a city built as a patch-work of neighborhoods and adjacent
incompatible land uses.

A major problem confronting Jerusa

lem's planners is the difficulty in enforcing an already
weak Master Plan (Tochnit Ha'av) as a means of controlling
this "patchwork" of neighborhoods and land uses.

As Mr.

Gadish went on to explain, Jerusalem's Master Plan is no
more than a general scheme, projecting the commercial,
social and transportation system of the city several years
hence.

The Master Plan, derived from the British Mandate

era (circa 1935), is archaic in that it only works from the
top to the bottom; there is little flexibility in response
to changing needs and changes are implemented without con
sultation or public participation.
Jerusalem, built on hilly terrain, is not a large
city in area and distances between the outermost suburbs
are not very great.

The center of the city is the business

and shopping district near Zion Square.

Not far from this

location is the spiritual heart, the old walled city and its
numerous holy places.

The commercial center, however, is

the focus of the Master Plan, which calls for dense building
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near the center of the capitol, resulting in a virtual
doubling of the central city population density.

it was

thought that centralization would unite the population
socially, bringing together diverse segments, while simul
taneously offering increased employment opportunities.

This

approach, however, became standard practice even in non
central city areas and, therefore, open spaces have not
generally been preserved in residential neighborhoods.

Thus,

starkness and high densities in many local neighborhoods
have intensified physical deterioration.
Finally, the major problem with the Master Plan is
that it is often honored in the breach.

Although there are

strict limitations on building height in certain parts of
the city, zoning variances are often easily granted.
Several major projects, such as the French Hill and Nebi
Samuel developments (housing projects built on the Judean
Hills surrounding the city), contradict the basic assump
tions of the Master Plan with its centralizing guidelines.
In fact, a number of planned and already constructed hotels
such as the Jerusalem Hilton Tower (30 storeys) are totally
opposed to the spirit of the plan, which aimed at eliminating
the spread of the city.

Architectural aesthetics, as a re

sult, are not consistent with the city's history.
It is against this backdrop that one can understand
the great difficulties the municipality has had to face in
coping with a population which has mushroomed from 201,000
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in 1967 to 361,000 in 1976.

It is doubtful that Jerusalem

has established the proper planning procedures that will
enable it to avoid the blight that threatens the city.
Jerusalem's objective problems become even more difficult
when one examines some recent statistical characteristics of
its population.

Fifty-three percent of all Jerusalemites

are of Asian and African origin, with a large majority of
these being in lower income categories.

Thirty-one percent

of Jewish families in Jerusalem have five members or more;
and only forty-five percent of Jerusalem's population is in
the labor force.60

Jerusalem, therefore, lacks the social

and economic resources to support itself.

Its population

structure is cumbersome to a city which must be concerned
with delivery of social services and rehabilitation of dis
tressed neighborhoods.
With regard to economic and social resources,
Jerusalem is inferior to Tel Aviv.

For example, the number

of families receiving welfare in Jerusalem is fourteen per
cent; in Tel Aviv 9.5%.

Of all housing units in Jerusalem,

forty-eight percent are substandard; in Tel Aviv twenty-two
percent of the total housing units available are substan
dard.61

These figures clearly indicate that Jerusalem must

cope with severe urban problems while it remains a poor city.

60

Israel, Central Bureau of Statistics, as reported
in the Bulletin of the Jewish Telegraphic Agency, December
31, 1976 , p. 2.
61
Ibid.
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Since the post-1967 unification, the municipality has de
voted insufficient attention to city planning problems.
It has approved the erection of new suburbs on the periphery
of the city without a balanced strengthening of the infra
structure and service networks in the city center.

Older

districts such as Nahla'ot, therefore, remain neglected;
their needs for social and physical rehabilitation are a
major part of the developmental problems facing Jerusalem.
General Description of Nahla'ot
Nahla'ot is an older, neglected area physically ad
jacent to two expensive and well cared for neighborhoods,
both of which are structurally opposite Nahla'ot - to the
southeast is Rehavia and to the west lies Kiryat Wolfson
(Fig. 2).

At one time the impact of such an arrangement,

although unplanned, pointed to hopes for at least a limited
success in achieving social integration.

As design had it,

poor and affluent neighborhoods bordered each other and the
children had to attend the same school.

While details of

this process will be discussed later, social integration has
not been fostered in general.

Instead, the poorer children

confronted the problem of raised expectations, which only
heightened feelings of frustration.
Nahla'ot is a downtown Jerusalem slum near Government
offices and the Knesset to the west and the Mahane Yehuda
central market area to the northeast.

Because of its cen

tral location, construction is going on all around the
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Fig. 2.

62

Nahla'ot in relation to greater Jerusalem

62

Carta's Jerusalem Map (Jerusalem: Carta Ltd.,1969)
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quarter's periphery.

The area is an old Jewish quarter

embracing several smaller neighborhoods - Sha'arei Hessed,
Nahalat Zion, and Sha'aeir Rabanim, built between 1900 and
1910, and Nahalat Ahim and Zichron Ahim built in the early
twenties and thirties (Fig. 3),

In the late fifties some

new buildings were built on the foundations of the old.
The quarter is located on a steep westerly slope
which makes construction difficult.

Most of the buildings

are made of stone.

The narrow streets are clean and the

walls whitewashed.

Clothes lines are strung across the

streets from one balcony to the other.

The quarter is so

full of houses that there is little space left for parks,
and children usually have to play in the streets.

Apart

from a few swings in one small park there are no playgrounds.
Narrow alleys, sidewalks difficult to travel, old buildings,
courtyards with dilapidated walls, and overcrowding compose
the fact of Nahla'ot.
Many of Nahla'ot's problems are derived from its
pattern of growth.

Many early Yemenite settlers built their

own homes, constructing one room and adding others over time
as they were able.

Plumbing was practically non-existent at

first, although added later in most cases.

Thus, a maze of

flat little houses grouped around small inner courtyards
sprang up, helter-skelter.

During the 1948 war many Jews,

fleeing battles raging in the Jewish quarter of the Old
City, settled in the Nahla'ot quarter; they were accommo-

Fig. 3.

Detail of Nahla'ot and Rehavia (enlargement of Fig.2.)
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dated in additional housing built upon a patchwork of streets
and alleys.

As a result of its history, Nahla'ot today has

deteriorated to a point where physical and social decay are
extant throughout the quarter, which is populated by large,
low-income families.
The National Insurance Institute, as may be recalled
from Chapter V, plays a major role in providing financial
assistance to low income

and/or large families.

In a per

sonal interview with the director of the Institute, Dr.
Israel Katz, an assessment of problem areas like Nahla'ot
was developed.63

While the hard facts of low income, poor

housing and education are undeniable, he noted other problems
arise beyond low-income levels, which involve life styles and
value systems.

Children in areas such as Nahla'ot develop

an acceptance of limitations which impede their ability to
make choices that might allow improved social and economic
opportunities in their future; the cycle continues with their
children.
Dr. Katz felt that education for the children in
neighborhoods such as Nahla'ot should not occur solely in the
classroom.

Rather many of Nahla'ot's disadvantaged children,

and their parents, have failed to respond to the general
pressures and demands put upon them when changing their
environment from a Casablanca, for example, to a Tel Aviv.

63

Interview with Dr. Israel Katz, Executive Director,
National Insurance Institute, Hotel Reich, Jerusalem,
August 21, 1973.
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Failure to adapt to a changed environment creates disparities
in family life and home environments significantly different
from higher-income European quarters.
Education, therefore, begins in the home environment
at an early age and instills a perception of the outside
environment.

It provides basic skills for adaptation to

that environment.

Failure to provide such a learning environ

ment in places like Nahla'ot is exacerbated by problems of
poor self-image.

As Dr. Katz explained, in any society dif

ferent groups have varying degrees of social honor and pres
tige.

People often behave in the image of themselves cast

by other people.

Similarly, one's

perceived opinion of

oneself is often based upon the social group to which one
belongs.

While this is not a new revelation in social theory,

it is significant for Nahla'ot.

The residents often exhibit

negative behavior - juvenile delinquency, prostitution, gamb
ling, drug-use - due to poor self-image.
Being mostly North African and Yemenite, Nahla'ot's
residents came from countries where they were by law, secondclass citizens.

This fact, in turn, fostered a second-class

self image which remained even after resettlement in Israel.
Nahla'ot's residents compared themselves to western or
Ashkenazi Israelis, and

self-esteem was lowered even further.

In another private interview, Asher Malke, a leader
of O.D.E.D.

(North African University Students Association)

at Bar Ilan University, confirmed the cycle of negative self-
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image from his own childhood.

By the time the child

achieves some level of social consciousness, two things
occur:

(a) a complete rejection of the parents' value system

which usually results in the breakdown of family life, and
(b) a shame and denial of one's Sephardic background stemming
from a false recognition that to be lavan (white) or
Ashkenazic is the standard.

He felt that much of the inte

gration between Sephardim and Ashkenazim occurs only after
a Sephardi submerges his ethnic identity, even though the
Ashkenazi never really establishes such a precondition for
interchange.

Mr. Malke quipped that the most extensive inte

gration between Sephardim and Ashkenazim usually occurs when
these youngsters come together to drink and smoke hashish. 64
While the psychological framework of Nahla'ot's
residents are a significant contributing factor to their
generally poor standard of living, the physical realities of
life in the quarter are equally important in gaining an over
all picture of life in the district
Housing Characteristics of Nahla'ot
A number of building types characterize Nahla'ot.
One is the single or two-storey house built of concrete with
stone facing.

These houses are built around a courtyard with

the kitchen and toilet outside against a courtyard wall.
64

Interview with Asher Malke, President O.D.E.D.,
Bar-Ilan University, Tel Aviv, August 31, 1973.

A

127

second type is the two or three storey stone building with
an outside stairway leading to entrance-way balconies.

The

kitchen and toilets are indoors, but shared by a number of
families.

Finally, Nahla'ot is characterized by the single

storey stone house not built around a courtyard, which usual
ly contains a basement where people live.

In addition to

these three housing types, there are also tin or wooden huts
scattered throughout the quarter.
Small apartments and serious overcrowding are the
pattern of the low housing standard in the quarter.

Most

apartments in Nahla'ot are much smaller than the Jerusalem
average.

The average number of occupants per room is 3 to

3.9, compared to 1 to 1.9 for the city as a whole.65

Most

of the apartments consist of one or two rooms; some families
have their own kitchen and bathroom, while others share these
facilities.

Interestingly this contributes towards improved

neighborly relations in many instances, as sharing the facili
ties involves needs for communication and social interchange
between those neighbors sharing the facilities.

Most of the

kitchens are narrow and their small size makes them inef
ficient.

Frequently they are not more than cooking corners

inside the living space.

In the numerous apartments where

there is neither shower nor bath, the family has to wash in
the corner of the living-room.

65

Some of the apartments lack

Yocheved Liron, Deprivation and the Socio-Economic
Gap in Israel
(Jerusalem:
Israel Economist Press, 1973),
p. 160.
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a hot water system and the occupants heat water on the gas or
oil stove.

These same facilities serve to heat the house in

winter, although some families have kerosene room heaters.
The dismal picture of structural conditions is large
ly due to a housing standard rooted in the past,when toilet
facilities were not regarded as an integral component of
apartment facilities.

A substantial number of the residents

make some improvements to their apartments, including both
owner-occupants and tenants.

While alterations are an at

tempt to improve housing standards, they tend to spoil the
outer appearance of the neighborhood.

Large families close

off their balcony with shutters to make an extra bedroom or
even another storey.
to a proper bathroom.

Most who do make improvements aspire
The resulting jumbled patchwork, while

improving the area structurally, adds to the crowded and run
down appearance in Nahla'ot.
As was explained by a social worker in the quarter's
local community center, the main housing problems in Nahla'ot
are dampness and overcrowding.

These affect both the physical

and mental health of all who live in the area.

Add to this

the common practice of several children sleeping in one bed
and/at times, even in the stairways. What emerges is a pic
ture of high failure rates in school, low levels of education
al attainment and high rates of crime and juvenile delin-
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quency.

66

The Demographic Structure of the Quarter
Population and Family Size
Nahla'ot is an old quarter founded in stages between
1900 and 1920.

The first settlers were native born Israelis

who moved from the Old City and immigrants from Afro-Asian
countries.

Approximately ninety percent of its present

residents arrived in Israel by 1945.

Kurds, Yemenites,

Syrians, Sephardis, Iraqis, and native-born Israelis predom
inate in the quarter.

Most of the families in the neighbor

hood are large,sometimes consisting of nine or more people.
There are also many families numbering more than six persons.
Much of this is due to the traditional mode of life in the
quarter, which encourages women to marry by the age of 18
and even younger.

Only a small percentage of families have

only one or no children.

The percentage of younger house

holds in the neighborhood is very low, due to an exodus of
those younger residents who have more mobility.
In spite of the high rate of natural population in
crease in the quarter, the area is in a condition of stag
nation and decline due to self-selective emigration.

The

population of the neighborhood,therefore, is gradually be
coming older and the permanent residents are mature adults

66

Interview with Menachem Sadinsky, Director Beit
Pomerantz Community Center, Jerusalem, August 15, 1973.
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and their elderly parents who immigrated with them, all
living in the same flat.

Those few families that purchase

a flat for their children one flight above or below them
actually live in a "clan" structure with four generations in
one household - grandparents, parents with their children,
one married son, his wife and their babies.
Educational and Occupational Levels
There are some young adults who, after military ser
vice, have not yet married and are still living in the paren
tal home.

While they constitute some of the work force, the

economically active population consists principally of the
older adults.

The children go to elementary school to age

14, while some, including girls, continue for two years be
yond in vocational studies.

Others who neither study nor

work find their outlet in deviant behaviors, such as delin
quency and prostitution.

Children in school and those serv

ing in the army constitute an additional burden on the family
budget, requiring pocket money and clothing.

There are many

youths of working age, therefore, but the father remains the
principle source of income.
There are families where the father is ill and the
wife works.

This often undermines the value system and

authority in the family.

Furthermore, there are other fam

ilies where neither of the parents work and must exist on
welfare allotments and relief.

The percentage of families

where both parents work is negligible.
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Educational level is difficult to determine in an
ethnically varied population, but generally, a picture of low
educational standards and achievement emerges.

According

to Mr. Sadinsky, surveys made in the quarter show a large
gap between level of formal education in Nahla'ot and the
national average.

Low educational level prevents the resi

dents from making progress and integrating in the stream of
modern life.67
There is a positive correlation between educational
level and occupation with job skills rising as education rises.
The proportion of those engaged in service industries, con
struction and trades, drivers and peddlers, is much higher
in Nahla'ot than those employed in technical and manufactur
ing occupations.

Few of the residents, however, are unemploy

ed .
Income
The average family income of IL 500-800 per month
derives from either wages or direct social welfare payments.
The proportion of wage income is low due to a low ratio of
breadwinners to family members.

The origin of the bread

winner has a considerable bearing on income level.

Income

of Asian and African immigrants is lowest in the quarter,
while that of native-born Israelis is the highest.

67

Ibid.

As Afro-
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Asian residents are a high percentage of the district's
population, there is a concentration of low-income families
in Nahla'ot.
The existing welfare methods are of little impact in
raising the income levels of deprived families.

A chief

reason is the social stigma attached to the welfare supported
population and its effect on the family's chances for improv
ing their situation.

Some families, therefore,avoid using

welfare services for which they are eligible.

The structure

of the welfare support system, which does not allow outside
employment, also has a deleterious effect upon lower income
families.

Where the head of a household may want to work in

order to supplement direct social welfare payments, but where
wage-income is inadequate to totally forego welfare payments,
the family will opt for the higher income available through
welfare.

These families are most vulnerable to fluctuations

in economic conditions, a frequent occurence in Israel.
Life-Pattern of a Family in Nahla'ot
When one visits a family in Nahla'ot, the implica
tions of income, education, family size and housing become
clear.68

Entering the family dwelling one finds no hall but

steps directly into a living-room which doubles as a bedroom.
There are a number of open shelves with a small collection of

68

A teacher/social worker from the Beit Pomerantz
Community Center accompanied me on a visit to a family in
Nahla'ot, acting as interpreter and adding some of the
descriptive material.
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china, utensils and glassware.
visible.

Some prayer books are also

In the center of the room is a wooden table with

five chairs.

The tabletop is strewn with schoolbooks and

writing materials.

In a corner of this central room is a

small kitchen containing a sink, cupboards, and a small
electric refrigerator.
There is an inner room which is smaller and contains
the parents' double bed, two folding beds for the children,
and a clothes cupboard.

The toilet and shower is beside a

stone wall in a cubicle separating two apartments.
are shared with another family.

These

The showerhead is open to

the floor and one must light a kerosene burner which heats a
small holding tank for hot water.

In spite of a generally

overcrowded appearance, the apartment seemed very clean.
In this two room apartment lived a family of tenhusband, wife, six unmarried children, and two aged parents.
The two youngest children sleep in the parents' bedroom.
The other four sleep with the grandparents in the living-room.
The father earns IL500 per month and. the mother works parttime as a domestic.

While they are at work

play in the streets

without supervision,although the grand

parents do provide supervision in the home.

the children

The parents are

not concerned if the older children do not attend school.
Often they are indifferent, or they prefer them to help with
the housework and care for the younger children.

It becomes

clear that the children are deprived of a basic education
because of frequent absences.
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While poor attendance contributes to the lack of
success at school, noise and overcrowding at home prevent
those who do attend from adequately preparing their lessons
or studying.

Most of Nahla'ot's children drop out of school

at age fourteen.

Those who do go on to high school (usually

a vocational one) are most often low achievers.

Many of

these drop out of high school so that they can contribute to
the family income.
Another element which contributes to the educational
failure of Nahla'ot's (and other Oriental) children was ex
plained by Dr. Avner Shaki, former Deputy Minister of Educa
tion.

The Israeli schools have a uniform curriculum drawn

up by the Ministry of Education, whose members are of east
European origin.

The curriculum is structured by a value

system originating in eastern Europe,

This does not coincide

with the scale of values of sixty percent of Israel's popula
tion, which is of Mediterranean origin.

Educational values

that originate in the Middle East were pushed aside in the
Israeli school curriculum as in other aspects of Israeli
lif e.
Educational theory holds that a child learns more ef
fectively when the curriculum is geared to his environment
and experience.

The learning process becomes one of drill

and memorization if content and standards appear meaningless
and unrelated to the child's experience.

The failure to

provide Sephardic and Oriental music, literature, folklore
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or religious philosophy deprives these children of positive
and meaningful self-identity and self-pride.

The monolithic

centralist approach can only result in the ultimate obliter
ation of the ethnic identity of those who cannot resist ef
fectively.

It is not surprising that children who have a

poor image of themselves and their cultural background fail
in school.
Of those who drop out of school, some enter the labor
market for long-term but unskilled, low-paying jobs.

Others

find casual, low status work which often leads to eventual
delinquency.

Youth clubs and movements do not attract these

children, who are filled with resentment, frustration, and
a sense of being discriminated against.

Even the Israel

Defense Forces reject many youths because of delinquency,
lack of education and adjustment problems.

Those who do

make progress in the armed forces, through acquired technical
and occupational skills, find their problems more acute upon
discharge.

They find it impossible to return to their old

milieu and they do not fit into a new social framework out
side the quarter.69
Overcrowding makes it difficult to maintain proper
standards of hygiene in Nahla'ot.
mental or physical, are high.

69

The chances of illness,

Infections are spread more

Dr. Avner Shaki, "Oriental Communities in the
Educational Network of Israel,"
lecture given at the Hotel
Reich, Jerusalem, August 14, 1973.
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readily under these conditions.

From an early age the normal

mental development of children may be impeded and normal
motor and intellectual development can be delayed or pre
vented altogether.
It is also difficult for the parents to live a
private conjugal life under these crowded conditions and it
is not unusual for young children to witness their parents'
sexual activity.

Grandparents living with the family also

suffer from chronic physical and mental illness and their
economic problems are added to those of the family.

Problems

of loneliness and boredom, and the need for help in perform
ing basic chores are common problems of the elderly, but they
are aggravated by the difficult physical conditions in
Nahla'ot.
The older people who came to Nahla'ot attempted to
build a home in accordance with cultural and religious tra
ditions.

While these traditions have left some imprint,

family life has since become much less rigid.

On the one

hand tradition preserves the family framework, but on the
other hand it inhibits the development of the younger genera
tion.

For instance, the father might prohibit a daughter

from attending school past the compulsory age of fourteen or
from working outside the home.

The younger generation is

ambivalent with regard to tradition which, while still an
obstacle in their path, exercises a powerful influence.

In

addition to living conditions, the ignorance and primitive
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outlook of the adults hold back the younger generation,
maintaining the family framework, but in an undesirable
state of stagnation.
The younger generation is obviously an important concern in Nahla'ot households and the nagging feeling that
their children are not keeping up with some other segments
of society is common among the parents.

As the mother of a

household summed it up:
We aren't social cases, just average working
people. But, somehow we haven't moved ahead
with the country. Why? Because we are unedu
cated and without good jobs.
That's why the
children's education is our only hope. Our
children should have the same opportunities as
European children. Our most serious problem is
youth, especially the delinquents and those who
feel they don't belong anywhere. Many are bitter
after being in the Army and some others don't
serve at all. We should have the best schools
with best teachers, so that our children can
become part of Israel.
Ironically, as the social worker emphasized, this
same mother, who is so anxious about education as a miracu
lous equalizing factor, so indulges her children that she un
wittingly prevents them from forming sound work habits.

Even

small children watch television until 11:00 p.m. and do not
get sufficient rest.

When asked how her children could stay

awake in school when they go to sleep so late, the mother
replied, "Just because the children are sleepy in the morning,
they should have the best of teachers to arouse their inter
ests. "
It is evident that Nahla'ot has an unsatisfactory
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way of life.

Material conditions are poor, presenting the

prognosis of a hopeless future for its inhabitants.

This is

especially devastating for the young who feel that it is
impossible to break out of the quarter's poverty stricken
environment.

Youth is torn between loyalty to the traditions

of the past and the modern life style which offers possible
satisfactions not provided by the old ways.

This conflict

is expressed by mental stress and, at times, delinquency and
violence.
Community Leadership in Nahla'ot
While Nahlaot's residents may not have ready solutions
to social problems, they certainly are not apathetic about
their needs.

There is a well defined leadership in the

quarter which formed originally to secure improved housing,
schools, cultural facilities, and community services.
leaders form a thin stratum of Nahla'ot society.

These

Most of them

are native born Israelis of Yemenite origin and are religious
ly observant Jews.

They are in a better economic position

than most other residents, having had a satisfactory education
and decent jobs.
The leadership group could well have left Nahla'ot
long ago.

They chose to remain and involved themselves in

local resistance to a government renewal program.

These

people have not left the quarter or cut themselves off from
local activities.

They work through the "Committee of Little

Nahla'ot" which was formed in 1972.

At that time, its work
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was aimed at opposing a proposed government plan for re
habilitating the quarter.

It has since expanded its role to

receive complaints on such matters as schools and municipal
services.
Nahla'ot was the first neighborhood in Jerusalem
where residents formed a community action group to success
fully oppose a government rehabilitation plan.

The plan

proposed by the government at that time was thought to be a
rational, comprehensive approach to slum clearance; it in
volved evacuation of the population, building demolition,
and construction of replacement high-rise apartments.
Israeli planners seem to insist on high-rise solutions to
slum clearance, although this approach has long been dis
credited in the United States and other Western countries.
The citizen committee's opposition to the plan was based upon
two considerations:

(1) an unwillingness to give up assets

in the quarter for what was felt to be inadequate compensa
tion, and (2) a feeling that the area did not require restor
ation.

In addition, community leaders feared that while

demolition of derelict structures characteristically proceeds
according to plan, their replacement with low-cost housing
often does not.

The Committee felt that Nahla'ot's residents

could best be assisted by low or no-interest loans to reha
bilitate their homes.

In their opinion the evacuation of

residents would not have been helpful

and would have nega

tively impacted upon low-income families.
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The Committee conducted an intensive and broad cam
paign against the renewal plan consisting of petitions,
meetings with government officials, protest demonstrations,
sit-ins, and lawsuits.

The campaign was carried on for two

years and in late 1975 the Government rescinded the renewal
plan and decided to explore other alternatives.

The Commit

tee still remains quite active, is trusted by residents, and
acts as an advocate on many issues.
At the same time as the "Little Nahla'ot Committee"
was formed, the "Public Committee for Zichronot and Nahla'ot,"
headed by a member of the Jerusalem Municipal Council, con
vened to support the renewal plan on grounds that new houses
would replace the demolished ones.

Few of the members or

supporters of this committee were home owners as was the case
with the former committee.

This Committee's influence is

very great in Zichronot (the neighborhood directly bordering
on Nahla'ot's north) but weaker in Nahla'ot.

As changes

occurred, the Zichronot group became active on the issue of
education and it induced the Jerusalem municipality and
Ministry of Education and Culture to integrate the schools
of Nahla'ot with those outside.

It conducts campaigns among

the residents and urges parents to provide adequate study
conditions for their children.
Each committee denies the other's right to represent
the residents of the quarter,

The Nahla'ot-Zichronot group

regards the other as a clique of house-owners fighting for
their petty interests, while the Little Nahla'ot Committee
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sees the other as government pawns, dictated by political
ambition.

Conflicts often arise which relate to personal

power struggles for local leadership.

These may, from time

to time, stir up the community and cause a great deal of
excitement, but in fact do not impinge upon the deeper
problems of the quarter's future development.

Fighting is

usually about positions of power and not about alternative
development policies or other local concerns.
Social Structure
Life in Nahla'ot is organized around ethnic-clan as
sociations which have political and economic influence in
proportion to their size.

Consequently, the Kurdish com

munity has the greatest influence.

Economic and social

organization is also established on a clan basis, drawing
on tradition as a guiding force.

Social life revolves

around twenty small synagogues organized by ethnic affilia
tion .
Ethnic solidarity in Nahla'ot contributes to the
strength of the group and, in time of need, applies organized
pressure to resolve a problem.

In the past the veteran fam

ilies were the wealthiest, which endowed them with leadership
status among their groups.

Today, for the third and fourth

generation of Nahla'ot residents, familial wealth has dimin
ished in importance as a base upon which social relations
are built,

Later generations now possess more political

acumen and

their sights are set more on municipal and
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national trade unions and political organizations.

Thus,

ethnic solidarity within Nahla'ot has been weakening over
time.

Nevertheless, veteran residents are bound to the area

by memories.

Their sons, who also created their own special

social pattern, are attached to the quarter in a way which
takes into account neither poverty nor bad housing conditions.
Thus, ethnic solidarity and special cultural patterns of the
residents create a social framework to which the residents
are attached.
Inter-generation conflicts remain in Nahla'ot, how
ever.

The young view political leadership within an organ

ized council and committee framework.

The elders, who main

tain traditional cultural patterns, maintain belief in tra
ditional, non-institutional leadership by heads of extended
families.

This generational conflict causes two problems.

First of all, the leadership of the elders and clan leaders
is basically particularistic and hinders the growth of a
democratic way of life.

Secondly, this leadership is usually

conservative and does not answer the needs of groups in a
modern society.

As a result the social framework in

Nahla'ot does not solve the economic and educational distress
of the family.
Services and Institutions
Services provided to the residents in Nahla'ot are
mostly public and include education, culture and entertain
ment, health, leisure, and general welfare services.
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Educational services.

Educational services consist

of two municipal nurseries and a limited number of kinder
gartens.

The shortage of kindergartens forces many parents

to send their children outside the quarter.

Some of the

children go to local elementary schools, while others, as
was mentioned in the general description, go to the Rehavia
elementary school.

In the Rehavia school, an attempt has

been made to implement a plan to integrate children from
Rehavia and Nahla'ot,
Up until 1970 the Israeli educational system was
based upon local districts.

The effect was that school

systems became differentiated according to the surrounding
ethnicity with wide disparities in school quality.

In 1970,

the Israeli Knesset voted to overhaul the school system,
providing for six years of primary, three years of inter
mediate and three years of high school education.

While the

primary schools generally are neighborhood schools, the
intermediate schools take in larger areas and necessitate
integration, whether by bussing or some other means.
Eliezer Shmueli, Director-General of the Ministry of
Education and Culture, explained that when Rehavia received
an influx of children from Nahla'ot in 1972, the children
soon made significant progress with the help of additional
teachers.

Unhappily, some parents from Rehavia were so upset

by the integration effort that in that same year they filed
a court suit challenging the right of the city to send
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children to school outside of their neighborhood.

It was

anticipated, Mr. Shumueli noted, that it would be difficult
to integrate people who, in certain ways, are not equal.
Many parents in affluent neighborhoods do not want their
children going to school with children whom they perceive to
be of lower social and cultural capacity and of inferior intelligence.70

Ultimately, the principle of school integra

tion was upheld in court.

To promote cooperation between

Rehavia and Nahla'ot's residents, however, the Municipality
voluntarily developed a modified, scaled integration plan
which approached integration gradually, grade-by-grade, until
integration through high school would be achieved over a
period of years.
Other educational changes, beside integration, have
been instituted in Nahla'ot as well as other poor areas.
Kindergartens and primary grades are open all day, from 8:00
a.m. to 4:00 p.m., instead of half-days as in wealthier areas.
There is special tutoring for those who require it.

In

addition, the school year is longer and lunches are provided.
Part of a special program for Nahla'ot children educates
them on an "activity method" basis whereby the children
study in work groups with two teachers in the classroom, one
the class teacher and the other working with weaker pupils.

Interview with Eliezer Shmueli, Director-General
70
Ministry of Education and Culture, Hotel Reich, Jerusalem,
August 15, 1973.
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While eight years have passed since these reforms
were instituted, adequate time has not elapsed to allow for
conclusive evaluations.

Mr. Shmueli did have some general

observations at the time of the interview.
Not long ago Israel's education system had
almost entirely neglected families and
communities. So we had the problem of cre
ating equal opportunities and not merely
equality of treatment.
This necessitated,
in part, inter-ethnic integration between
neighborhoods and integration between the
native-born and more recent immigrants.
The communities Shmueli refers to are particularly
disadvantaged ones, of Asian and African origin, as is the
case with Nahla'ot.

The generations of immigrant parents in

these communities, he noted, have undergone an important
change due to some of these educational reforms.
They have gone from apathy about their
children's education to an aggressive
interest in it . . . Perhaps because
they believe that education is the only
chance their children have to break the
social barrier.
Contrary to the findings
of such researchers as Christopher Jencks
in the United States, education in Israel
is the main tool for social mobility.71
Welfare services.

Direct payments aside (refer to

Table X, Chapter V), welfare services in Nahla'ot consist of
a welfare bureau office, a mother and child care center and
a Kupat Holim (Histadrut sick fund) clinic (see Chapter IV,
"The Protectzia System").

71

Ibid.
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The services of the welfare bureau are aimed at pro
blems of illness and disablement, families with a large number
of children, marriage problems, unsatisfactory housing, and
other problems.

Relief takes the form of financial aid to

cover the expenses of subsistence, rent, vocational training,
and child-care.

The mother and child care center helps

mothers look after their children and also instructs them
during pregnancy in prenatal care.

The medical personnel

at this facility and the Kupat Holim Clinic often serve un
officially as social workers in addition to their regular
duties.
Recreational opportunities and community centers.
The problem of relations between ethnic groups stems from two
factors:

(1) the differences in way of life, culture and

tradition, which are very real and can only be overcome
gradually, and (2) the socio-economic gap between Asian/African
immigrants and Western ones.

It is obvious that there is no

magic solution to these problems, nor is there room for a
policy aimed at "homogenizing" the different ethnic groups.
A policy which the Israeli government has developed
to deal with some of the problems created by the above fac
tors is a system of neighborhood and community centers,
particularly in the more disadvantaged areas such as
Nahla'ot.

The function of these community centers falls in

the following areas:
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1. To bring together different social segments of
neighborhood communities; to narrow the social gulfs separat
ing different age, religious, educational, national, and
income groups.

These efforts bring Nahla'ot residents to

gether with those of Rehavia and Kiryat Wolfson.
2. To engage in efforts to combat juvenile delinquency
by providing alternative options in recreational, cultural
and educational opportunities.
3. To supplement "in-school" education to foster higher
levels of educational achievement, particularly among dis
advantaged groups.

These efforts include special after

school tutorial programs to improve reading and study skills.
4. To provide adult education aimed not only at personal
development but also parent education in creating the proper
atmosphere for their children's educational development.
5. To encourage the appreciation of local and national
cultures through mutual exchange programs.

Cultural activity

is seen as one bridge to the absorption and integration of
the different groups and as a starting point for communal
. .
72
activity.
Nahla'ot enjoys the benefit of two community centers,
a small one in the heart of the neighborhood that serves
mainly children

and the larger Beit Pomerantz Community Center

just outside Nahla'ot.

72

The youth center in the neighborhood

Sadinsky interview
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has activities occurring from 4:00 - 11;00 p.m.

Youth are

offered a diversified program including sports, handicrafts,
dance, films, trips, holiday parties and a summer day-camp.
A social worker is employed full-time in the center and a
part-time teacher gives supplementary lessons to children who
have difficulty in school.
The Beit Pomerantz Center is located just northwest
of Nahla'ot.

It was founded by private donations from mem

bers of the Jewish community of Los Angeles and later sup
plemented by Jewish Agency funds.

Its location purposely

serves the residents of Nahla'ot, Kiryat Wolfson and Rehavia,
although it is somewhat distant from the latter.

The intent

of the location is to provide a point of contact between
children of the various ethnic groups as well as between
religious and secular youth.
The Center provides extensive and varied activity
such as sport and handicraft groups, workshops and drama
groups.

It also offers a library and swimming pool.

Accord

ing to the Center's Director, Mr, Sadinsky, of the 3,500
members registered, some fifty percent come from Nahla'ot,
the greater part of whom attend the center frequently
(three times per week or more).

The young people of

Nahla'ot (and in theory any other district) are given re
ductions in membership dues based upon family income.
Special activities are organized for them, such as supple
mentary afternoon lessons and vocational training in wood
and metal work etc., for those not working or in school.
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A special educational project at Beit Pomerantz, as
well as other centers around the country, is the use of
volunteers, mostly college students, to help Nahla'ot
high school students in their weak subjects.

The munici

pally sponsored program seeks to at least limit, if not
eliminate, the educational gap,

Even those who did well in

their local elementary schools often have trouble adjusting
to the requirements of high school, because they missed so
much that neither home nor school could provide.

If they

are not helped at the outset, they cannot keep up, and after
a year or two they drop out of school.
The volunteers in this tutorial program work with
two students each, usually meeting with them in their homes
in order to extend some influence on the family.

Sometimes

the volunteers persuade parents to keep their children in
school instead of sending them out to work.

They also assist

the families in many other ways, such as explaining the con
tents of official letters and what must be done about them.
It is hoped that through this process families will learn to
keep the house quiet during study period and will come to
understand the conditions required for effective learning.
Another of the Beit Pomerantz Center's most valuable
activities is the preventive family counseling service.
Parents, usually mothers, come to see one of the social
workers at the Center to talk about troubles they are ex
periencing with their children.

The children, when they

want to, are provided an opportunity to tell

their side of the
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story.

When they are ready, parents and children may discuss

their family problems at weekly meetings where parents
gather to discuss family relationships.
According to Mr. Sadinsky, the preventive counseling
service has proven to be quite successful and, in many cases,
invaluable to families where traditional authoritarian
patterns are giving way under the impact of new social
forces.

Youngsters in such families often rebel against

seemingly arbitrary parental authority and break away before
they are prepared to take care of themselves.

The program

at Beit Pomerantz tries to prevent young people from becoming
delinquents.
Despite the varied activities offered by the two
centers, many of the children and adults of the neighborhoods
do not participate.

Young people in particular, who are not

in any formal framework, constitute the potential for delin
quent activity.

The youth of Nahla'ot have problems similar

to those of other low-income, disadvantaged youth in the
country.

They drop out of school, have difficulty in ob

taining fixed employment, and have problems of adjustment
to military service.
While some progress has occurred in terms of inter
ethnic or inter-class integration at the Beit Pomerantz
Center, it usually involves children rather than adults.
In spite of numerous efforts, most residents of the higherincome Kiryat Wolfson and Rehavia simply do not want to
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participate in activities at the Center,

They avoid the

adult and "inter-cultural" functions in particular.

It

is obviously quite difficult to change the mentality of
people who do not want to mix.

At the same time, many of

the adult residents of Nahla'ot also fail to participate
for the same reasons.
One other important reason

for the lack of partici

pation in community center activities are religious institu
tions.

These consist of several synagogues and a number of

yeshivot (theological seminaries).

The synagogues are

small, usually having one ethnic group as its congregants.
These synagogues express the religious character of the
quarter.

While the synagogues are clearly centers of

prayer, they also constitute a social center for a large
number of the older residents.

When the synagogue serves

in such a capacity, it is common for these people to ignore
the community center which may be viewed as a distant govern
ment project.
Summary and Conclusions
Nahla'ot is characteristic of distressed neighbor
hoods within large Isreli cities.

Living side-by-side are

residents of a low economic standing and those well-to-do
and long established.

Economic and social gaps between them

widen as relations between the generations deteriorate.

At

the same time, institutions charged with improving social
and physical problems are not equal to the task.

Some pro
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gress has occurred in improving education.

Hopefully,

third and fourth generations will be able to free them
selves from the distress of their parents and grandparents.
It is possible that Nahla'ot can be rehabilitated.
The ethnic character of the area, however, must be respected
and preserved.

Only then will it be a pleasant place to

live, with good services, and social and cultural integration.
The quarter has great potential for change.

There is hope

that the gap between life patterns will diminish.

With this

end in view, integrated and coordinated action is required
based upon the following conclusions;
1. Physical conditions, particularly those of housing,
must be improved in order to alleviate the problems of fam
ilies living in overcrowded conditions.

The burden of young

families living in high densities must be relieved by
providing a greater number of structurally adequate dwellings.
2. The system of delivering social services must be made
more effective.
3. Deviant behavior, especially among youth, must be
uprooted by coordinated educational and law enforcement
action.
4. New dialogue between veteran residents and newer
immigrants should begin as a means to create a healthier
social climate.
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Regional Planning in Israel: Kiryat Gat and
the Lachish Development Region
The Lachish Region is the result of a mid-1950's
development plan which became the prototype of regional
planning in Israel.

The overcrowding of Israel's major

cities, causing problems such as those of Nahla'ot, were al
ready foreseen in the early 1950's by some Israeli planners.
They attempted to develop a strategy of dispersing popula
tion when waves of immigration were at their peak.
An urban neighborhood, such as Nahla'ot, is character
ized by a generally homogenous population, clinging to a cul
ture and ethnic background.

The inhabitants have not been

able to integrate into the mainstream of Israeli economic,
social and cultural life.

Problems in Nahla'ot-type neighbor

hoods often result from the failure of planning to provide
opportunities both for physical and personal development.
The Lachish Region, with Kiryat Gat as its urban center, on
the other hand

can be viewed as a planning effort which

successfully intervened in the physical, social and economic
development of the area.

Included in this process was the

provision of opportunities for the personal development of
its residents, comprised of a large number of ethnic groups.
These groups were able to retain and maintain their cultural
heritages while mixing with other segments of Israeli society.
Physical Description
Lachish is a development region in southeast - central
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Israel, comprising a 275 square mile area (see Figs, 4-6).
The region includes three geographically distinct farming
areas:
1. The western part, belonging to the coastal plain,
contains mostly light soils suitable for citrus cultivation.
2. The central portion consists of heavier soils util
ized for intensive field crops.
3. The eastern part belongs to the foothills of the
Judean Mountains and is characterized by fruit orchards, to
bacco, sheep pasture, and field crops.
Outpost settlements of Negbah and Gvar Am were es
tablished in the western part between 1939 and 1947.

After

1948 a network of thirty-one moshavim and kibbutzim were
established.

Development in the central and eastern portions,

however, was thwarted by an insufficient water supply.

With

construction of the Yarkon-Negev conduit in 1954, the Lachish
Development Project was established as a regional planning
scheme for agricultural and later industrial development.
Background
Immigrants arriving in Israel during the post-indepen
dence waves of immigration began to settle the Lachish area
in 1955.

The Ministry of Absorption placed a certain propor

tion of immigrants in rural areas.

At that time, thought

was not given to ethnic background in immigrant placement.
The many ethnic groups who were placed together, therefore,
encountered many cultural discrepancies which had to be recon
ciled.

Many of these new immigrants, originating from back-
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NORTH EASTERN SUB-DISTRICT Suitable for intensive
tree cultivation (apples, deciduous fruits), carobs, alfruit
monds, figs, etc. Also grain crops and grazing. Here will be
built farms of up to 40 dunams, of which 15—20 dunams will
be devoted to fruit trees. Each farm to have additional 40
dunams of grazing land.

WESTERN DISTRICT In part suitable for
oranges, to have orange farms or mixed farms
consisting of up to 30 dunams per farm unit.

CENTRAL SUB-DISTRICT Conditions are suit
able for irrigation. Farm units will consist of 40
Irrigated dunams, to stress cultivation of industrial
crops (sugar-beets, cotton, etc.).

EASTERN SUB-DISTRICT Conditions are suitable to
dry farming and grazing. Border settlements, organized
as kibbutzim-, to be established.

Fig. 4.

73

Land utilization in the Lachish Region 73

Keren Hayesod, Operation Lachish (Jerusalem:
Ha'aretz Press, 1957), p 20.
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Fig. 5.

Lachish Region in relation to central Israel 74

74
Israel, Ministry of Labour-Dept, of Surveys,
Survey of Israel, 1977.
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LAKHISH
REGION

Fig. 6.

Detail of Lachish Region75

75Avshalom Rokach, Israel Today-Regional Rural Devel
opment (Jerusalem:
Israel Digest Publ., 1964), Appendix A.
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ward environments, were suddenly required to learn new life
styles .
Keeping in mind that Lachish was an agricultural set
tlement plan, passions and economics became enmeshed in the
region's main problems which were:
1. How to reconcile the differences between veteran
Israelis and new immigrants.
2. How to resolve cultural conflicts among various
ethnic groups,
3. How to train immigrants to become farmers and workers
capable of managing both their complex farm economy and their
own regional affairs.
4. How to attract technicians and public service work
ers to the rural areas.
The problems faced by the Lachish Region in 1955 were
solved in great measure by the nature of the agricultural
settlements themselves.

The original settlers of Lachish are

currently veteran farmers of the region, a phenomenon in
extricably linked to the growth of the State of Israel.

From

its inception, the structure of agricultural settlement in
Israel has been based on the cooperative idea.

This was a

result of not only a desire for economic efficiency and in
telligent organization of marketing and purchasing but, in
many cases, the social and ideological propensities of the
settlers.
The Lachish Region was a success because planners
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recognized the importance of the Moshav, which became the
basis of the Region's organization.

In fact, between 1948

and 1972, 442 new villages were established in Israel, of
which ninety-eight are kibbutzim and 291 are moshavim.

76

Most of the new immigrants who have chosen agriculture as
their livelihood, therefore, have shown a preference for the
moshav, whereby families own and manage each farm, over the
kibbutz, where property is owned by the commune (i.e. coopera
tive moshav versus collective kibbutz) ;

(see Figs. 7-9) .

The residents of moshavim are much more strictly or
ganized than those in villages or towns.

Such organization

does require sacrifice of a certain amount of individual
autonomy over land management and profits.

This lack of in

dependence, however, has transformed many Jews from North
African countries, who never had contact with the soil, into
real farmers using modern agricultural techniques.

Immi

grants who had neither formal education nor vocational train
ing were often directed towards the moshavim of Lachish during
the mid-1950s.

Since that time these same immigrants have

learned to calculate the profits of their agricultural labors
It may be that what is most important to them is the profit
these territories yield rather than the Zionist ideology of
exploitation of the soil.

Even if the moshav may not be ideo

logically successful, it is economically.
The moshav concept in Lachish served particularly

76Israel, Facts-1975, p.61.
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KIBBUZ
(COMMUNAL VILLAGE)

Fig, 7.

77
P • 15

.
77
Schematic detail of a kibbutz

Israel, Ministry of Labour, Atlas of Israel, 1970
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moshav shitufi
(COLLECTIVE SMALLHOLDERS VILLAGE)

Fig. 8.

78

Ibid,

Schematic detail of a moshav shitufi78
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moshav ovdim
(SMALLHOLDERS VILLAGE)

Fig, 9.

Schematic

79Ibid,, p.16.

detail

of a moshav ovdim

79
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well to integrate diverse peoples into wider Israeli society.
The Lachish plan sought to group people according to country
of origin in the same moshav and even in a series of moshavim
comprising a settlement area.

People from these moshavim,

however, have had to mix with other types of people when
utilizing services available only at a series of rural and
regional centers.

The effect was maintenance of ancestral

traditions while allowing for gradual modernization.

These

immigrants, who were often very close to the secular tradi
tion they brought with them, learned to develop a cooperative
structure for rural land development and to accept trans
formation in agricultural technique as new technology was
introduced.

The younger generation, enjoying the benefits

of more advanced education, led their parents towards ration
al exploitation

of the land, social integration and very

strong Israelization.

80

The Lachish Plan
As the success of the moshav settlements became ap
parent, both the settlers and the government agencies in
volved in settlement projects saw the utility of implement
ing the cooperative concept on a regional scale, integrat
ing agriculture, industry and services within a defined

80

Moshe Minkowitz, "Old Conflicts in a New Environ
ment: A Study of a Moroccan Atlas Mountains Community Trans
planted to Israel," The Jewish Journal of Sociology, Vol. IX,
No. 2, (December, 1967), p. 196.
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area.

Such a plan required the improvement of agricultural

production and the laying of a basis for a different system
of services.

These changes required a new framework for

organization of rural life on a regional scale.
The initial base for the restructuring of rural,
moshav life became the rural center, which served to intro
duce educational facilities and higher order health, com
mercial and technological services.

The functions of the

rural center, however, had to reach beyond mere provision of
services.

As agriculture improved, less people were re

quired as farmers and it became important to retain these
people in the area.
economical units

To achieve this, light industry of small

had to be introduced (e.g. packing and

sorting operations).
In the search for a solution to the introduction of
industry as a means of retaining population, the notion of a
composite rural structure crystallized.

It was comprised of

agricultural, service and industrial personnel.
The scheme depicted in Fig. 10 aims at combining
optimal

exploitation of local natural features with the

speedy absorption of a maximum number of immigrant settlers
in productive employment.

It provides for the establish

ment of clusters of four or five farming villages, each
having forty to one-hundred families, grouped around rural
centers.

Whereas the villages have local services (elemen

tary schools, groceries), the rural center offers higher
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order services (middle schools, clinic, central market, etc.).

Rural Center

REGIONAL
TOWN

Fig. 10. Schematic detail of a composite rural
structure
The rural center also serves as a meeting ground for
immigrants from different countries, thereby furthering
their mutual integration and distributing service costs
over several hundred families.

Each ethnic group, housed

in their own settlement, has the opportunity to perpetuate
its own traditions without needless friction and, at the
same time, share a rural center with other groups.

This

arrangement has helped the settlers of each group to cement
themselves together as a cooperative unit.
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RURAL CENTRE AND ADJACENT (
SMALLHOLDERS VILLAGES

Fig, 11. Schematic map of a rural center in relation
to adjacent moshavim81

81Atlas of Israel, p.17.
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Rural Center

REGIONAL TOWN

Fig. 12.
Schematic map of a regional town in rela
tion to its surrounding area and associated rural center.82

82Ibid., p.18.

J
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The Lachish Region is a hierarchical arrangement of
settlements which increase in size and complexity of economic
function as one moves closer to the Region's center.
this hierarchy

In

the rural centers and their adjacent vil

lages, depicted in Fig. 11, are the basic economic unit.
The rural centers are in turn linked to a rural-regional
town (Fig. 12) which provides economic, social and cultural
opportunities,including banking and secondary education.

A

region in the Lachish sense, therefore, consists of a
network of composite rural structures

(Fig. 10) ultimately

linked to the Region's urban center of Kiryat Gat.
Kiryat Gat
Kiryat Gat functions as the Lachish Region's highest
order urban center.

Therefore, it provides employment in

regional administration, processing of the region's agri
cultural produce, and services.

In 1954 Kiryat Gat was

planned for a population goal of 7,500.

The current popula

tion is 25,000 and the city's revised master plan calls for
an 80,000 population by the year 2,000.

Of the current

population, fifty percent originate from Asian and African
countries including a large Indian-Jewish community.
Twenty-five percent are from Europe, South America and the
U.S.S.R. and twenty-five percent are native-born Israelis.

83

83Interview with Havi Shlagi, Senior Planner, Depart
ment of Rural Settlement and Municipal Planning, Office of
the Mayor, City of Kiryat Gat, August 27, 1973.
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The road network links villages to their rural
centers and these in turn are linked to Kiryat Gat.

The

location of Kiryat Gat was planned to achieve regional cen
trality with its site at a crossroads of regional traffic,
thus facilitating its development as a center of regional
economic activity.
Economic Development
The origin of Kiryat Gat was initially to provide
higher order services requiring a larger minimum population
threshold than rural towns could provide.

Among these

services were a hospital, secondary school, police and cer
tain professionals such as physicians and lawyers.

It was

not long before an economy based upon more than services
was felt important to the future development of both
Kiryat Gat and the Lachish Region.
The development of the city's economy began not only
with services rendered to the Lachish Region's rural settle
ments

but also with industries based on farming products.

The enterprises first to become operative included grain
storage and processing, cotton gins, a sugar refinery, and
various produce sorting and grading plants.

Before long

other industry came to Kiryat Gat, not all directly connect
ed with agriculture.

A cotton spinning mill, three cotton

weaving mills, a wool processing plant, three knitwear
factories, a clothing factory, a diamond cutting plant, and
an electronic equipment plant, are just a few.
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One of the main factors in this acceleration of
growth in Kiryat Gat was the water piped to the area and
its surrounding region, which has tripled the irrigated area
from the time of the Lachish Project's inception.
nearly 500,000 dunams84
irrigation.85

Of the

cultivated today, 150,000 are under

The development of newly established settle

ments allowed greater functional specialization in the area
so that, for example, dairy farms in the eastern district
could rely on the field-crop farms in the center district
for many of their supplies.

Development of the entire

region was boosted in this fashion.
Ashkelon, on the west coast, is the largest city in
the Lachish Region.

It has also profited greatly from the

Lachish Project, although not by original design.

Whereas

Kiryat Gat was planned from the start as a center for the
surrounding agricultural region, Ashkelon depends on indus
try focused upon its port facilities and tourism.

Mostly

for reasons of convenience, villages in the western coastal
belt prefer to use the services of Ashkelon rather than
those of Kiryat Gat.

Not all services, however, are

available in Ashkelon.

Lachish farmers, regardless of

proximity to Ashkelon, require agricultural processing
plants, warehousing, and marketing facilities, available
only in Kiryat Gat,

Farmers must also look to Kiryat Gat's

84one dunam equals one-quarter acre,
85

Shlagi interview.

Fig. 13.
86

General plan of Kiryat Gat 86

Israel, Ministry of Labour, Dept. of Surveys,
Kiryat Gat-1975.
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government offices for technical guidance in connection
with farm planning and development loans.
Physical Structure of Kiryat Gat
Kiryat Gat developed in stages and it was felt impor
tant to ensure that industrial and economic services be phy
sically separate from other amenities Kiryat Gat was to pro
vide.

The general layout of Kiryat Gat (Fig. 13) consists of

three residential areas, a central block housing administra
tive offices and a cultural center (civic plaza), a commercial
district, scattered areas reserved for parks and playgrounds,
and an industrial belt near the railway line.
The industrial area, to the southeast of the city,
was left open to one side to allow room for growth to the
south and southwest.

Since its inception, the industrial

area was twice enlarged to make room for new enterprises,
while the commercial region in the center was replanned and
a municipal park designed.

At the same time, the local

labor demand also made it necessary to attract additional
population by stepping up housing construction.
Employment in Kiryat Gat is fifty percent industrial,
thirty percent services and the remainder in agriculture,
housing and miscellaneous related occupations.87

Those in

industrial occupations work in plants in the industrial belt
which occupies 300 acres.

Each industrial facility is re

sponsible for providing certain services for its workers,
87

Shlagi interview.
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including transportation to and from the plant and day-care
centers for female employees.
From the beginning, a modest commercial center was
built, principally for the use of the villagers.

As the

industrial district grew, the commercial district has under
gone vast expansion, with many more shops, a hotel and
several cinemas.

District offices of the various Ministries,

local government offices, the office of the Lachish Regional
Authority, and branch banks were opened in Kiryat Gat to
serve the entire region.

Educational services have gradually

been built up to include, at present, nine primary schools
and two secondary schools.

Two more post-primary vocational

schools are planned as well as adult education facilities.
Housing and Neighborhood Design in Kiryat Gat
Neighborhood structure in Kiryat Gat is similar to
the composite rural structure of the Lachish Region in
general.

Each small neighborhood has its center equipped

with a grocery store and other small-scale facilities which
provide for daily basic necessities.

At the same time,

neighborhood centers are not allowed to develop to the
point of competition with the large commercial-cultural
district in the center of town.

This serves to foster the

interaction of ethnic groups from the neighborhoods.

The

town center, by providing a socialr cultural and commercial
milieu, has developed a broader outlook among Kiryat Gat's
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residents, emphasizing their belonging to a city as a whole
rather than the confinement of the neighborhood alone.
This confinement was experienced by many of Kiryat Gat's
residents in their countries of origin.
Several types of standard housing were planned and
built in Kiryat Gat, ranging from two to five rooms.

As of

1973, 12,200 housing units had been built and 1,000 were
under construction.

Many of the units are low-rise semi

detached and extensible, allowing the owner to enlarge the
living space as the standard of living rises.
As is the case in most of Israel, residents of
Kiryat Gat live in cooperative housing managed by tenant
committees.

While there is more architectural and size var

iety in Kiryat Gat's housing than in many other Israeli
cities, it is nevertheless based upon a characteristic
Israeli institution - the neighborhood unit of near identi
cal, cooperatively owned apartments known as the shikun.
The shikun is a planned housing development, often built as
a housing estate for people who already know each other,
which may be owned by specific ethnic groups, professions,
or political party members.
based upon ethnic ties.

In Kiryat Gat shikunim are

Thus, a large part of the popula

tion lives within the confines of a particular ethnic group
and usually speaking the same mother tongue.

Because the

city is so small, it is still much easier to know "practic
ally everybody in town" than it would be in a larger city.
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In a residential neighborhood the most restrictive
factor affecting way of life is population density.

Ideally,

a city should offer a range of residential options with
respect to densities.

Generally, neighborhoods are physical

ly distinct from each other based upon their particular
land use arrangement.

In order to foster social cohesion

and, thereby a sense of community belonging, residential
neighborhoods in Kiryat Gat were established with assumed
optimal building densities in mind.

Such a density ought to

avoid, on the one hand, sparsely built areas whereby large
distances between residential districts would tend to create
architectural and social voids.

On the other hand, an overly

dense environment which threatens the individual and in
trudes upon privacy is also undesirable.
During Israel's early years, the ruling architectural
style in development towns was low building density.

In

addition to social disadvantages, this style created economic
burdens of land wastage and increased expenditures for municipal services per capita.88

Planners in Kiryat Gat, con

trary to common practice at the time of its establishment,
favored greater building density as a means to create a
more urban way of life.

Thus, economic problems resulting

from a policy of sparse building have been alleviated.
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"Symposium on Residential Quarters," Adricalut,
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Social relationships also have been strengthened because
the neighborhood in Kiryat Gat was viewed as an instrument
for social integration.

The composition of population was

planned with homogenous groups living together closely, yet
still part of a larger heterogenous community.

All people

would have opportunities to meet, share common interests
and develop neighborly relations.
Urban development in Kiryat Gat, therefore, is large
ly the product of communal organization, within which the
residential neighborhood is seen as a subsystem of the
larger urban settlement.

Residential neighborhoods, there

fore, were physically structured so as to enhance the pursuit of city-wide communal activities.89

Just as there is a

hierarchy of villages and towns there is a hierarchy of
residential neighborhoods.
There are, however, always caveats in the implemen
tation of any development plan.

For Kiryat Gat it centers

on the neighborhood.
The problem of the status of the neighborhood
in development towns has been a controversial
one.
On the one hand, there are planners who
believe in the concept of a town without neigh
borhoods (among others, those who advocate
linear planning).
On the other hand, there are
planners who emphasize the clear need for neigh
borhoods . . . both extremes should be avoided.
The neighborhood unit, in which all of the
inhabitants know one another, can constitute an
important factor in the social and psychological
89
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integration of immigrants in the cohesive Israeli
society.
One must, however, avoid over-emphasis
on the neighborhood, since this might lead to par
ticularism, exaggerated fragmentation and over
seclusion of the population of the neighborhood.
A small-town mentality, hostile to the growth of
a large urban society, could develop in the town
as a result.90
The Future of Kiryat Gat and the Lachish Region
Although Kiryat Gat has outgrown the limits set in
the original plan, its economic basis is still the agricul
tural region that surrounds it, with its numerous villages
and farming families.

All the services and ammenities

which the rural centers cannot provide are supplied by
Kiryat Gat and, therefore, a large part of the income of
the city's business enterprises are derived from this farm
ing population.

Conversely, many of Kiryat Gat's inhabitants

find seasonal employment in the farming villages at harvest
time.

The city's growth and progress, therefore, has

been the result of the Region's agricultural output and the
farmer's utilization of its urban facilities.
The regional structures of the larger Lachish Dis
trict has enabled individual settlements in a particular area
to pool resources.

Central economic and consumer services

were cooperatively established to the advantage of all
residents.

The cooperative experience has meant the institu

tion of, for example, cultural activities, tractor stations,
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and product processing plants, as well as the employment
of high-level technicians to serve the Region.

Due to co

operative production, profits of enterprises have remained
in the hands of these rural communities.

In a more con

ventional economic arrangement, however, the benefits of
agricultural production and processing would have been
siphoned off to external urban centers.
The educational network in the Lachish Region is
based upon equal opportunity and uniform curriculum.

The

impetus which established the school system stemmed from
the settlers wish to educate their children within a rural
setting while still meeting urban educational standards.
The result has been a minimizing of the cultural and educa
tional gaps between rural and urban sectors.

In addition,

by dispersing population, the Lachish notion of regional
planning has provided an alternative to the dilemma of
urban sprawl.
Retention of rural population
Regional settlement in Lachish has, so far, proven
a success in yet another direction.

It has played an im

portant role in preventing the drift of population from
rural areas to the town and city.

One factor which usually

encourages such migration is the gap in standards of living
between rural and urban areas.

This phenomenon is common

in countries where technology and industrialization are
moving rapidly ahead, where industrial expansion brings
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TABLE XV
Characteristic Development Stages of the Family Farm91
Farm
Characteristics

Subsistence
Farming

Mixed
Farming

Specialized
Farming

Composition of
branches:

Basic foods

Varied products

Key crops

Purpose of
production:

Own
consumption

Own consumption
plus marketing

f'larketing only

Income:

Low

Medium

High

Ratio of income
to output:

Low

Medium

High

Work schedule:

Seasonal

Balanced

Seasonal

Labor/Capital
ratio:

Hidden
unemploynent

Primarily labor

Primarily capital

Dependence on
supplementary
industry:

Slight

Parital

Complete
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economic prosperity and a rising standard of living, and
where manpower demands siphon rural migrants into urban
areas.
In Israel, population movement from rural to urban
areas has not been as marked as in some other countries.

With

agricultural and rural development there has been, in fact,
some migration from the cities to rural areas, partly as a
result of significant government economic incentives.

This

situation, however, is changing and recently the problem
of absorbing surplus manpower has arisen in Lachish.
There are several reasons why a surplus of manpower
may be expected in Lachish,

The farm units are constructed

so as to sustain one family each.

As the children of the

family form their own households, they often lack non-agricultural sources of livelihood.

As a rule, only one son

can take over the parental farm, and even that is not possible
if the father has younger children and is physically capable
of running the farm.
As the moshavim in the Lachish Region have gone from
subsistence to specialized farming (Table XV), there is hope
that more non-agricultural

branches of industry will be

expanded and created to cope with a growing labor force.

The

pressure for industrial expansion arises not only to provide
non-agricultural pursuits for the second and third genera
tion in the Region, but also due to the difficulty of in
creasing agricultural production much further.

Fortunately,

the impact of an outmigration has yet to be seriously felt
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in Lachish.

Indeed, pressure has been exerted on the

settlement authorities by young farmers and married couples
to find a means of settling them near their parents and kin,
even if they must engage in non-agricultural occupations.
The process of rural-to-urban migration, while ac
cepted universally as a natural phenomenon in "modernizing"
societies, is not in line with the rural-regional structure
as it exists in Lachish.

A sizeable portion of the Region

is inhabited by Asian/African immigrants who still adhere to
a traditional patriarchal social structure, even in the
second and third generations.

There is a strong inclination

among these rural inhabitants not to leave the area, but
rather to find a way of remaining, whether it be through a
farming livelihood or otherwise.
The inclination to remain in Lachish has led to the
establishment of development companies which also engage in
industry.

At first, the main endeavors in Kiryat Gat were

industries connected with agriculture and its development,
including those which supply agriculture with inputs pur
chased outside and those based on the processing of raw
materials provided by agriculture.

Today, Kiryat Gat is

experiencing the development of companies which have gone
into neutral industries as well, not connected with farming
and with the main goal being to create non-agricultural
employment.
92
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The experience of Kiryat Gat and The Lachish Region
points to the importance of a flexible approach to regional
development, which is capable of recurrent adaptation to
changes in the structure and organization of the rural com
munities on which the region is based.

The Lachish program

has responded to each of the development stages in Table XV
according to changing production needs.

The physical and

organizational framework of the Region has changed with
shifts in the character and production level of the moshavim,
which comes as a result of improving technological conditions
and population growth.

CHAPTER VII
PERSPECTIVES AND CONCLUSIONS
The nature of early Jewish immigration to Israel cre
ated the character of the modern state.

Israel today is

struggling with the twin problems of culture and community
along several dimensions, one of which concerns country-oforigin communities.

Israel is a composite of distinct com

munities, each sharing a common ancestry and cultural heritage.
For most of Israel's modern history, the perpetuation of
such communities was discouraged because they conflicted with
the Zionist goal of creating a new Jewish unity which would
be impeded by cultural pluralism.

Cultural conflicts arose ,

in great part due to disagreements over whose values would
form the focus for a new Jewish identity.
Zionist pioneers from Russia and Poland, possessing
a socialist orientation, represented the driving political
force and pioneering efforts of modern-day Zionism.

They

have, therefore, dictated the patterns of cultural, polit
ical, social and economic organization that have formed the
new state since the 1920's.

These twentieth century pioneers

obfuscated the importance of earlier waves of immigration,
mostly Sephardi, which began as early as the fifteenth cen-
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tury, long before Zionism as a political movement had any
meaning.

Sephardim, who had long established their settle

ments in Jerusalem, Jaffa, Safed and Hebron, were not oriented
towards rural development or collective economic activity.
Though they were long the established majority in Jewish
Palestine, they lost their dominant status after World War I.
Sephardim were replaced by Zionist elements of East European
origin,who placed new emphasis upon cooperative land settle
ment rather than urban development.

Thus, the ideologies of

modern day Zionists were new and aggressive; they became the
basis for shaping Jewish life in the land.
By the time Israel was established in 1948, the
organized and dominant community was virtually an extension
of East European communities.

After statehood Sephardic and

Oriental Jews began coming to Israel in large numbers and
within a short time were equal to the European population.
While European immigrants were easily absorbed into a culture
that was predominantly theirs, the Sephardim and Orientals
had to adapt to a strange culture presented to them as the
only authentic modern and Jewish culture.

Before long

Oriental and Sephardi Jews became the numerical majority,
due to a higher birthrate, while remaining a cultural minor
ity.

Immigrants from outside the Yiddish speaking world of

the Israeli establishment were labelled "backward", even
though many Sephardic and Oriental Jews originated from highly
developed societies.

The veteran Ashkenazim, therefore,
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sought to "civilize" their Sephardic brethren by bringing
them into East European Jewish culture/ in the guise of
Western civilization.

In the process, the indigenous cul

ture brought by the Sephardim and other non-Europeans was
undermined.

As a result, these populations lost not only

their self-respect but also the respect of their children,
who thought they had brought nothing of real value to con
tribute to the State.

This notion has been perpetuated by

the Israeli educational system, which in a number of ways
taught all children that Ashkenazi culture, as filtered
through the Zionist movement, is Israeli culture.
While the development of Israeli society and the
communal tensions which were created along the way may hold
special sociological interest, the impact of this social
development has created difficult problems from a planning
perspective.

The end result (until today) of Israel's

social development was not only the creation of economic
gaps between Sephardim and Ashkenazim but also a cultural
disruption which may be even more severe.
Both economic and cultural disruptions in Israel
have serious consequences for intercommunity relations be
cause they are so closely linked with ethnicity.

Economic

gaps between communities have, in large part, resulted from
a national effort to achieve rapid economic growth.

Such an

effort necessitated the provision of incentives for those
engaged in needed enterprises and possessing certain skills.
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Differential pay rates in favor of needed skills obviously
resulted in wage inequalities.

Policies aimed at providing

incentives to encourage immigration of needed occupations
to Israel were intended to raise the standard of living of
all sectors of the population through long-term development
of the national economy.

The short-term effect, however,

was to increase income differentials to the disadvantage of
Sephardic and Oriental populations.
In any society there exist

higher and lower income

groups with economic and social polarization developing be
tween them.

This polarization has more serious implications

in Israel, however, because socio-economic status differences
are so directly linked with ethnic origin.

The denigration

of cultural and economic capabilities of Sephardic and Or
iental Jewish communities in Israel did not cause the de
struction of the overt or manifest dimensions of community
life and did not lead to the disappearance of these commun
ities.

Rather, these communities have persisted in a de-

culturated and economically deficient form, frequently
exhibiting a great deal of hostility towards those whom they
see as having deprived them.

In Israel, therefore, the

process of assimilation is still incomplete and these com
munities will continue to represent basic elements in the
compound of Israeli society.
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Israel's Social Development-Implications for Planning
Given the nature of Israel's social development and
structure, an overriding question emerges as to the nature
of future planning in Israel.

In addition, one may ask what

are the lessons of Nahla'ot and Lachish in terms of their
links with both the economic and cultural dimensions of com
munal life in Israel.
In general, Nahla'ot is an example of a community in
which both the economic and cultural dimensions of communal
conflict have been perpetuated.

No example better illustrates

this condition than the educational system.

While the ef

fort to integrate the school which serves both Nahla'ot and
Rehavia has generally been successful in achieving a physical
mix of different ethnic groups, children from Nahla'ot are
alienated from the educational system due to the structure
of the Israeli educational curriculum.

In this connection

it should be noted that, as in most modern industrial coun
tries, Israel's educational system represents the norms and
values of the middle class.

In Israel these values are prac

tically identical with the European population whereas most
of the disadvantaged youth are of Asian-African origin.
Consequently, the child begins his education by exposure to
a foreign value system and a gap develops between expectation
and achievement.

The child from a slum area, such as

Nahla'ot, finds himself at a disadvantage when entering the
school system and the chances of pupil alienation from school
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are greater.

Dropping out of school naturally leads to later

problems in securing employment and in adapting to the struc
ture and responsibility which employment involves.

From this

point it is only a short step to social deviance and an in
ability to enter normal economic life.
While the problem of Israel's educational system re
mains a difficult one it may be outside the realm of the
planner to implement change in this area.

The efforts of the

planner in Israel, however, can go a long way in alleviating
the cultural dimension of communal conflict in Israeli urban
environments.

The source of a great deal of communal con

flict in Israel stems from the lack of social interaction be
tween different ethnic groups in its society.

This fact is

particularly striking in Nahla'ot, which is characterized by
communal insularity, even though Rehavia and Kiryat Wolfson
border upon it.

How

then can the planner direct efforts to

wards providing opportunities for residents of Nahla'ot-type
neighborhoods to participate in social, cultural, and eco
nomic life outside its immediate environs?
Government participation in the planning process is
a critical factor in accomplishing a broad range of social
and human goals, including the supply of low and moderateincome housing, to provide for optimum use of space and
recreation areas, and to stimulate the economic and social
development of disadvantaged neighborhoods.

While the moti

vations of planners in Israel may be well-intended, two
traditional approaches have dominated:

(1)

local imposition
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of plans from the "top-down", and (2) that physical rehabili
tation alone results in the improvement of social conditions.
In Nahla'ot and elsewhere planners have felt that improving
the physical environment and forcing people to physically mix
would somehow generate social cohesion and community between
differing ethnic and social groups.

If the experience of

Nahla'ot and Rahavia illustrates anything, it is that social
interaction is difficult to foster across differing population
groups.

As seen in Nahla'ot and Rehavia there is an extreme

reluctance of different populaces to mix.

Even within

Nahla'ot there exists a reluctance by many of its residents
to extend their realm of social interaction marginally, such
as crossing outside the neighborhood boundary to participate
in activities at the Beit Pomerantz Community Center.
The Lachish Experience-Implications for Urban Israel
The experience of the Lachish Region and Kiryat Gat
in particular, while rooted in a rural framework, does have
application to a more common urban context.

The Lachish

Plan, unlike the experience in Nahla'ot, has been a directed
attempt to reverse the economic and cultural dimensions of
communal conflict in Israel.

It aims to provide more satis

fying physical, social, and economic environments for its
residents.

By contrast, planning in Israel's urban neigh

borhoods has stressed the development of physical environ
ments to the neglect of social and economic ones.
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Economic Development of the Lachish Region
It would be misguided to convey a sense of utopian
existence for the Lachish Region's inhabitants based upon a
grand social experiment.

Rather, some measure of social

harmony which exists in the Region and in Kiryat Gat has
resulted more from the Region's economic success than social
design.

The goals of the Lachish Development Plan were of

a spatial, economic, and social nature.

Achievement of these

goals was intended to serve as a model for incorporating a
region with development potential within a national system
of decentralized economic regions.

It was seen as a method

of counteracting urban agglomeration, populating vacant
regions, tapping resource potentials, settling large numbers
of immigrants who would otherwise create an imbalanced pop
ulation distribution, and integrating diverse social elements.
The success of the Lachish Plan and Kiryat Gat de
pended upon those economic opportunities it could provide
to potential residents of the area.

While new immigrants

could, in a sense, be forced to live in a region, they could
not be persuaded to remain without available economic op
portunities.

Similarly, it would not have been possible

to attract established and educated middle-class Israelis
to Lachish without economic opportunities and incentives.
The social success of Lachish relied on the creation of ec
onomic opportunities which, in turn, depended upon Lachish's
situation in a national urban hierarchy of settlements.

191

The higher Lachish ranked in Israel's regional hierarchy
the greater its draw upon population outside the Region, who
responded to opportunities for employment and its rewards
and the provision of local services for consumption.
The development of the Lachish Region with Kiryat
Gat as its urban center has been successful in attracting
and subsequently increasing its population.

It has been a

social success because it has been successful economically,
providing a standard of living which promotes the interaction
of diverse ethnic groups who inhabit the area.

Thus, a large

measure of the Region's economic success may perhaps be due
to its close adherence to the principles of central place
theory, which guided the development of Lachish's economy
and society since its inception in 1954.
Christaller's Central Place Theory maintains that
a certain amount of productive land supports an urban cen
ter.

The center exists,in turn, because essential services

must be performed for the surrounding land.93

This theoret

ical framework can be most easily applied to rural, thinly
settled areas such as Lachish in its earlier days.

Central

place theory envisions a system consisting of "hamlets
which perform a few simple functions such as limited shop
ping (Lachish's rural centers), to larger towns which serve93

93 Edward Ullman, "A Theory of Location For Cities,"
in Readings in Urban Geography, ed. by Harold Mayer and
C,F~ Kohn
(Chicago:
University of Chicago, 1959),pp.202-209.
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as market and service centers for a small contiguous area
comprised of several hamlets

(Lachish's rural towns), up to

a centrally located large city (Kiryat Gat) with a large
tributary area composed of a network of hamlets and smaller
towns, which serves to provide more complex services such
as wholesaling, large-scale banking,specialized retailing
and the like,"94
.
Lachish is not a self-contained community and, as
one would expect, various forms of interaction between the
Region and other parts of Israel occur.

Israel, being a

small country, has larger urban centers in relatively close
proximity to Lachish.

Its residents, therefore, frequently

travel to Tel Aviv, Jerusalem, Ashkelon, Beersheba and
elsewhere for higher order economic and cultural services.
Nevertheless, as an independent economic region, Lachish
conforms fairly closely to central place theory.

The

impact of central place theory on Lachish has generally
been to ensure the economic and subsequent social success
of Lachish as a regional development scheme.
The Lachish Development Plan corresponds to two
objectives of Israeli policy in connection with spatial
organization.

The first objective was to achieve a change

in urban structure by facilitating a diffusion of hierarchi-
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cally arranged smaller size population centers in undeveloped
areas.

The second objective was regional integration of a

network of central place-type hierarchies:
Regional integration envisaged the new towns as
service centers for the agricultural hinterland,
enabling the agricultural population to get com
mercial services within their vicinity. The new
towns had to fulfill an important economic role
in the processing and marketing of agricultural
products and in absorbing labor surpluses from
the rural settlements.
For the implementation of
this objective, the size and location of a con
siderable number of new towns were determined
according to the so-called central place theory,
under which is established a full hierarchical
structure. . . .New towns in the role of service
centers were designated to increase the ef
ficiency of the marketing and distribution system
throughout the whole country.
. . .the new urban centers also serve as focus
es of culture and entertainment, and as filters
to reduce by absorption the flow of rural migrants
to the big towns.95
Social Development of the Lachish Region
Lachish is more than a set of spatial and economic
goals.

There were social goals to the region as well.

A

hierarchical system of settlements was applied in the
Lachish Region not only to stem rural-to-urban migration, as
suggested by Shachar, but also to integrate diverse social
elements within a singular framework.

Lachish's economic

success, however, was a precondition for social integration
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to occur due to its catalytic role.

Experience in Lachish

indicates that when people of different cultural backgrounds
interact with each other on an equally competitive economic
footing they also relate to each other more as social equals.
In comparison, relationships between Rehavia's residents
and those of Nahla'ot did not achieve any measure of social
equality because no economic parity exists between the
residents of the two neighborhoods.
Physical as well as economic development also played
a significant role in the social development of Lachish.

A

city such as Kiryat Gat has promoted the integration of
diverse social elements in a physical way.

A variety of

building types placed around open malls and parks and inter
spersed with walkways, playgrounds and public spaces provide
a psychological and architectural focus for promoting
social integration of the different ethnic groups which re
side there.

Thus, the close proximity of opportunities for

social interaction based upon an architecturally human scale
was employed as a means of reforming rather than rejecting
city life.
Planners in the early years of Kiryat Gat had a keen
perception of the impact of physical development upon human
behavior.

While Kiryat Gat's planners provided opportuni

ties for various ethnic groups to live within their own
neighborhoods, they also created a physical environment of
public places which helped these groups cope with the cul-
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tural shock of interacting with others.
Final Comments
It is apparent from the case studies in Chapter VI
that the twin goals of achieving a socially balanced com
munity on the one hand and a high quality of urban life on
the other are very difficult to achieve.

In Kiryat Gat it

was observed that the goal of a socially balanced community
is attainable when the balance is supported by economic op
portunity .
Kiryat Gat and the Lachish Region in general have
developed, over a long period of time, a means for equaliz
ing housing and employment opportunities, for bringing to
gether population groups of different ethnic backgrounds,
for creating a physical framework that encourages social
interrelationships and integration, and a means for improv
ing the quality of life through use of an efficient land-use
pattern and attractively designed housing and public areas.
From the Lachish experience one could derive three
social goals to guide Israel's future social development,
whether applied to urban areas, new towns, or rural develop
ment regions:
1.

Developing a higher and more uniform quality of

housing and higher standards of living for those segments
of Israeli society which do not currently possess either,
2.

Integration of various ethnic groups within

Israeli society, and
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3.

Closing economic and social gaps which exist due

to time of arrival in Israel,
If there is one common thread which links Lachish,
Nahla'ot and Israel it is the need to introduce improved
ways of building communities of people.

This recognizes

that the individual is at the same time an independent unit,
a member of an extended family, and a member of different
arrays of groups, called communities, upon which a national
community is built.

In all these respects the individual

needs opportunities to develop his human potential.
It is unfortunate that there is a tendency among
Israeli planners to think of cities as physical structures
with technological and economic bases manned by labor forces
rather than as systems of social organization.

As a result

Sandberg notes that:
One of the striking anomalies of . . . Israel is
that social planning is not very advanced. This
is particularly interesting for, as a consequence
of their socialist orientations and the creation
of a broad complex of social welfare programs, it
could well have been expected that meaningful
social planning processes would have been develop
ed. We find instead . , . that planning is geared
to physical and economic concerns and less to
social needs, particularly the problems of the
poor and minorities.
Social planning as defined by Perloff is "an
interrelated system that introduces socio-economic
and human behavior considerations into the making
of governmental and private group decisions."
The critical need is for the integration of physical,
economic, and social planning at the national level,
because social gains often depend on the use of the
power of the national government.
This can facili
tate the establishment and ranking of social goals,
the creation of programs for human resources develop
ment and problem solving, and the collection of data
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for systematic analyses of social indicators.96
Sandberg's comments suggest certain conclusions as
concerns Israeli planning efforts aimed at promoting future
physical, social, and economic development.

If planning for

people is to be taken as a reality, then plans for the wel
fare of those people must be put at the forefront of the
planning process.

The various aspects of planning-plan

making, physical design and development, and community
development-should be considered as one interrelated process
concentrated on the provisions of a healthy community life.
Israel's social development in the twentieth century
found Sephardi and Ashkenazi Jews, more specifically the
northeast European and the southeast Mediterranean Jew,
pitted against one another for cultural dominance in the new
State of Israel.
dominant role.

The East European Jew emerged

in a

In the Lachish experience provision of

economic opportunities were a prerequisite in order for the
cultural and social restoration of non-East European ethnic
groups to occur.

Thus this discussion has come full circle.

While economic opportunities are certainly not the
only basis on which to diminish social inequalities in
Israeli society, they are most important when seen as part
of the wider opportunities that people need in order to

Neil C. Sandberg,
"Can The United States Learn
From The Experience of Other Countries? A Commentary," in
New Towns: Why-And For Whom?, edited by Harvey S. Perloff
and Neil C. Sandberg, (New York:
Praeger Publishers, 1972),
p. 72.
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achieve their human development potential.

If social inte

gration is to be achieved in Israeli society the major
planning thrust must be the provision of wider opportunities
for low-income groups to more equally participate in Israel's
economic life.

Only through future efforts at closing gaps

in economic opportunity can Israel succeed in closing gaps
in social opportunity.
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